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Social Media and the Vanishing 







Social media are extraordinary communication and 
preservation tools brimming with fonts of incriminating, 
exculpating, and impeaching evidence. Legal professionals 
have already added online profiles, instant messaging, and 
videos to the list of information sources about their clients, 
their opponents, and their potential witnesses. Still, the bulk of 
legal authority and ethical guidance is rooted in precedent 
based on antecedent technologies, which has little resemblance 
to the emerging social centers of cyberspace. No guidelines for 
criminal defense discovery or investigation within networked 
social spaces can be found in existing statutes and ethics codes. 
One ethics committee has taken the lead on this issue in an 
opinion curtailing the limits of surreptitious witness 
investigation through Facebook. Defense counsel‟s duty to 
zealously and effectively represent their clients, the practical 
desire to avoid being sued for malpractice, and the promotion of 
the fair administration of justice all require a clear 
demarcation of the ethical and constitutional boundaries for 
accessing and using data from social networking sites. This 
Article will examine the dual nature of social media as a 
communication conduit and information warehouse, the 
meaning of privacy in this environment, and the ethical and 
legal dilemmas inherent in prosecuting and defending cases 
with this new breed of evidence. 
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Association. J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John‟s 
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Our brick and mortar world is receding into a virtual 
landscape. There is an online realm where hundreds of millions 
of people are conversing, networking, and logging the details of 
their lives. This new mode of human interaction does not fit 
neatly into any discovery statutes, case law precedents, or 
ethics codes. Indeed, the administration of justice is struggling 
to adapt to this emergent reality with little guidance. The 
social networking era, marked by the creation of instant 
communities and depots of personal information, is pushing 
legal practice towards the vanishing points for ethical and 
constitutional boundaries. 
The virtual socialscape exists at right angles to the 
physical world, and so our perceptions must bend accordingly. 
In the first decade of this new century, people became 
accustomed to recording increasingly larger amounts of data 
about their lives and activities. Five hundred million Facebook 
users can‟t be wrong.1 The creation and development of social 
media seems to satisfy a very deep biological need.2 Another 
 
1. WILLIE RASKIN, BILLY ROSE, & FRED FISHER, FIFTY MILLION 
FRENCHMEN (1927); See Scott Duke Harris, Facebook Milestone: 500 Million 
Members; on to 1 Billion?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 21, 2010, available 
at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_ 15568209?nclick_check=1 (“If Facebook 
gallops ahead at its current pace, the 1 billion mark would indeed be reached 
in 2011. The online social network Mark Zuckerberg and a few Harvard 
classmates founded in 2004 went from zero to 250 million users in five 
years—and doubled that number over the past 12 months despite controversy 
regarding its privacy protocols.”). Cecilia Kang, Facebook to Hit 500 Million 
Users, But Meteoric Rise Has Come With Growing Pains, WASH. POST BLOG 
(July 19, 2010, 5:00 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/facebook_hits_500_million
_user.html (“The Silicon Valley Web site is now the biggest online trust of our 
vacation photos, electronic rolodexes, and recordings of how we felt about 
President Obama‟s candidacy for president, the ban on headscarves in France 
and the Lindsay Lohan‟s rollercoaster ride with sobriety. Seventy percent of 
users are outside the U.S., and one-quarter of all users are checking in and 
updating their pages from their cell phones.”). 
2. The explosive growth of social media is due to advances in technology, 
but its driving force might have originated in the depths of the mirror neuron 
response, i.e., the need to imitate. See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells that Read 
Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006 (“The human brain has multiple mirror 
neuron systems that specialize in carrying out and understanding not just 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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important indicator of this subtle migration has been the 
growth of personal computer hard drives from megabytes to 
terabytes.3 The amount of information people collect about 
their own lives, combined with the data scattered through 
countless government and commercial databases, are filling 
citizen libraries.4 And the volume of information being 
 
the actions of others but their intentions, the social meaning of their behavior 
and their emotions.”); Shankar Vedantam, How Brain‟s „Mirrors‟ Aid Our 
Social Understanding, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/24/AR2006092400718.html (“Three new studies 
published independently last week in the journal Current Biology have 
yielded new insights into „mirror neurons‟ and point the way to two intriguing 
conclusions: The mirror system seems to be involved in the human capacity 
for language, and people with stronger mirror neuron responses to sounds 
seem to also have a larger capacity for empathy, suggesting the mirror 
system is part of the brain mechanisms that produce altruistic behavior.”); 
Use of Social Media in Fashion Industry, THE VEDA BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.vedainformatics.com/blogs/use-of-social-media-in-fashion-
industry/ (“Recent research on social media indicates that there may be 
biological mechanisms that influence individuals who are active in the world 
of social media. This brain-to-brain link where one person‟s opinion, 
movement or behavior influenced the brain cells of others through 
interpersonal orchestration is known as mirror neurons.”). 
3. See Michael Kanellos, Here Comes the Terabyte Hard Drive, CNET 
NEWS (Jan. 4, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-6147409.html (“A 
terabyte is a trillion bytes, or a million megabytes, or 1,000 gigabytes, as 
measured by the hard-drive industry. (There are actually two conventions for 
calculating megabytes, but this is how the drive industry counts it.) As a 
reference, the print collection in the Library of Congress comes to about 10 
terabytes of information, according to the How Much Information study from 
U.C. Berkeley. The report also found that 400,000 terabytes of e-mail get 
produced per year. About 50,000 trees would be necessary to create enough 
paper to hold a terabyte of information, according to the report. Who needs 
this sort of storage capacity? You will, eventually, said Doug Pickford, 
director of market and product strategy at Hitachi. Demand for data storage 
capacity at corporations continues to grow, and it shows no sign of abating. A 
single terabyte drive takes up less space than four 250GB drives, which lets 
IT managers conserve on computing room real estate. The drive can hold 
about 330,000 3MB photos or 250,000 MP3s, according to Hitachi's math.”). 
4. No doubt “citizen libraries” chronicling the lives of ordinary people 
will soon rival the bulk of Presidential Libraries. Compare PETER LYMAN & 
HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2003, at 2 (2003), 
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-
2003/printable_report.pdf (“According to the Population Reference Bureau, 
the world population is 6.3 billion, thus almost 800 MB of recorded 
information is produced per person each year. It would take about 30 feet of 
3
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consumed far outstrips the amount being stored.5 
Profiles, tweets, and YouTube videos are the equivalent of 
pyramid building, an effort by individuals to defeat time and 
overcome their mortality by preserving a colossal monument to 
their lives, albeit measured in gigabytes instead of cubits. The 
data from this life logging6 is creating a form of “micro-
celebrity,”7 memorializing actions and thoughts for 
indeterminate time periods and creating buzz for forums where 
 
books to store the equivalent of 800 MB of information on paper.”), with 
About the Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.html 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2010) (“Twelve Presidential Libraries maintain over 400 
million pages of textual materials; nearly ten million photographs; over 15 
million feet (5,000 km) of motion picture film; nearly 100,000 hours of disc, 
audiotape, and videotape recordings; and approximately half a million 
museum objects.”). 
5. See ROGER E. BOHN & JAMES E. SHORT, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2009 
REPORT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS 14 (2009), 
http://hmi.ucsd.edu/pdf/HMI_2009_ConsumerReport_Dec9_2009.pdf 
(“According to some estimates, the total amount of hard disk storage 
worldwide at the end of 2008 was roughly 200 exabytes. In other words, the 
3.6 zettabytes of information used by Americans in their homes during 2008 
was roughly 20 times more than what could be stored at one time on all the 
hard drives in the world.”). 
6. See generally Gary Wolf, The Data-Driven Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2010 (“One of the reasons that self-tracking is spreading widely beyond the 
technical culture that gave birth to it is that we all have at least an inkling of 
what‟s going on out there in the cloud. Our search history, friend networks 
and status updates allow us to be analyzed by machines in ways we can‟t 
always anticipate or control. It‟s natural that we would want to reclaim some 
of this power: to look outward to the cloud, as well as inward toward the 
psyche, in our quest to figure ourselves out.”); Life-Logging and the 
Generation Gap over Privacy (NPR Radio Feb. 14, 2007) (“Daily 
documentation has become routine as the tech-savvy [] connect with 
everyone, anyone, anytime. . . . Guests on the program talk[] about „life-
logging,‟ a system that documents every conversation, movement, and idea 
through a series of recording gadgets like GPS trackers and even brain 
scanners.”) 
7. See Clive Thompson, Clive Thompson on the Age of Microcelebrity: 
Why Everyone‟s a Little Brad Pitt, WIRED MAG., Nov. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/15-12/st_thompson 
(“Microcelebrity is the phenomenon of being extremely well known not to 
millions but to a small group—a thousand people, or maybe only a few dozen. 
As [Do It Yourself] media reach ever deeper into our lives, it's happening to 
more and more of us. Got a Facebook account? A whackload of pictures on 
Flickr? Odds are there are complete strangers who know about you—and 
maybe even talk about you.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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“microfans” know and debate the intimate details of strangers 
outside the pale of news media. Additionally, the virtual 
socialscape is more than information creation and storage; it 
encompasses communication and interaction.8 The 
administration of justice, the investigation of crimes, and the 
defense of the accused are being changed at the intersections 
with this virtual world. 
This Article will examine the current state of social media, 
the cross-sections and currents that bring its users into the 
legal realm, and the existing laws and ethical rules that are 
guiding attorney conduct. Law and technology tend to develop 
along parallel lines. The principles and foundations of the legal 
system are over-layered by changes in society and electronic 
information sharing. It appears that social media and Internet 
behavior are leading the drive towards change.9 Although there 
are no bodies of statutes and precedent to offer leadership in 
this area, the necessity of legal processes has already begun to 
bring some order to the untamed continent inhabited by 
Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, and Twitter. 
In Part I, the panorama of online communities, which have 
inspired hundreds of millions to create profiles and publish the 
 
8. The will to communicate, the need to express the details of our lives so 
that others can consume them, extends back to the dawn of consciousness. 
See Prakash Chakravarthi, The History of Communications from Cave 
Drawings to Mail Messages, IEES AES MAG., Apr. 1992, at 30 (“Crude 
drawings on rock and cave walls are the earliest methods of communication 
which we know. Though it was cumbersome and slow it helped to convey 
ideas and past events to other people.”). 
9. See generally Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network 
Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 
(Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html (“The rise 
of SNSs indicates a shift in the organization of online communities. While 
websites dedicated to communities of interest still exist and prosper, SNSs 
are primarily organized around people, not interests. Early public online 
communities such as Usenet and public discussion forums were structured by 
topics or according to topical hierarchies, but social network sites are 
structured as personal (or „egocentric‟) networks, with the individual at the 
center of their own community. This more accurately mirrors unmediated 
social structures, where „the world is composed of networks, not groups.‟ The 
introduction of SNS features has introduced a new organizational framework 
for online communities, and with it, a vibrant new research context.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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unguarded moments of their personal existence for global 
audiences, will be explored. The definition of privacy and the 
meaning of access in online social centers will be examined in 
Part II. Part III will discuss the current methods of electronic 
discovery and their broadening applications to social media. 
Parts IV and V will analyze the importance of preserving social 
networking evidence both as an obligation for the prosecution 
and a necessity for the defense. Undercover investigation, 
pretexting online, and the ethical fallout of such practices in 
the socialscapes of Facebook and MySpace are reviewed in Part 
VI. 
The parallel processes of traditional legal procedures and 
the line of technology that has revolutionized communication 
and information practices will be viewed through several 
notable legal developments. Facebook and MySpace have 
already come to play an incipient role in acquiring jurisdiction 
and initiating litigation in civil and criminal proceedings. 
These sites have provided law enforcement with information 
for arrest and search warrants, and laid the foundation for 
indictments, and in some cases convictions. On the civil side, 
courts have approved service of process through a defendant‟s 
online profile. In both arenas, the contents of online profiles 
and instant messages have played an important role as 
evidence at trial. But this is only the beginning. These media 
will eventually become a routine part of serving warrants and 
complaints, boilerplate discovery requests, evidence in all 
manner of proceedings, and ultimately, newly discovered 
evidence for post-conviction motions. For the criminal 
defendant, social media content might prove to be the DNA of 
newly discovered exonerating evidence. 
 
I.  Social Media, Social Networking, and Every Tweet in 
Between! 
 
Social Networking provides a different avenue for familiar 
patterns of human behavior and public concern. For instance, 
“flash mobs,” which are groups of young people connected by 
instant messaging alerts or e-vites, join in spontaneous 
activities. Since these “flash mobs” have led to some public 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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disturbances, they are now the object of law enforcement 
surveillance.10 People in prison or on the run are also using 
Facebook and similar outlets.11 The professional conduct of 
attorneys, prosecutors,12 judges,13 as well as the behavior of 
clients,14 witnesses, and jurors15 have all been touched by social 
media. 
Depending on the perspective, social networking can 
complicate legal practice and due process in different ways. 
Criminal defense counsel have a constitutional obligation to 
effectively represent their clients and fully investigate their 
cases. Both civil and criminal practitioners face legal liability 
and ethical imperatives in handling the representation of a 
client. 
The measure of professional competence in a society that 
interacts virtually necessitates asking questions such as: what 
Social Networking Sites (SNS) are people using to 
communicate and store information and how are they being 
utilized?16 Will the information found on Social Networking 
 
10. See Debra Cassens Weiss, FBI to Monitor Social Media to Fight 
„Flash Mobs‟ of Roving Teens, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 25, 2010, 7:36 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fbi_to_monitor_social_media_to_fight
_flash_mobs_of_roving_teens. 
11. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Escaped Convict Captured After 
Telling of His Exploits on Facebook, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 25, 2010, 10:58 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/escaped_convict_captured_after_telli
ng_of_his_exploits_on_facebook/; Meg Handley, How Prisoners Harass Their 
Victims Using Facebook, TIME.COM (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1964916,00.html. 
12. See, e.g., Rochelle Olson, Hennepin County Prosecutor Accused of 
Anti-Somali Posting on Facebook, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/local/84525452.html?page=1&c=y. 
13. See generally Ken Strutin, Pitfalls of Social Networking for Judges 
and Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 2010, at 5 [hereinafter Pitfalls] (The author 
discusses ethics opinions and disciplinary decisions demarcating the lines for 
the behavior of judges and attorneys connecting through social media). 
14. See Molly McDonough, First Thing Lawyer Tells New Clients: Shut 
Down Facebook Account, A.B.A. J., Feb. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/first_thing_lawyer_tells_new_clients
_shut_down_facebook_account. 
15. See generally Ken Strutin, Juror Behavior in the Information Age, 
LLRX.COM (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/jurorbehavior.htm. 
16. See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Twitter Quitters Outnumber Tweeters, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2009 (60% stopped using Twitter after a month); 
7
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Sites be admissible?17 Are there any privacy protections or 
barriers for materials stored on third-party sites?18 Since 
almost everyone else is already using them—for example 
clients, witnesses, and jurors—digital contents are coming in as 
evidence of guilt, impeachment, and innocence. Therefore, 
knowledge and understanding of technology will help in 
investigation, discovery, and jury pool and venue challenges. A 
lawyer‟s professional responsibility ought to include staying 
abreast of this changing virtual environment.19 
Defense counsel need to have the same level of knowledge 
about social networking that is required to intelligently handle 
forensic evidence, i.e., some basic understanding of the 
principles and mechanics of its operation.20 The more detailed 
 
Teddy Wayne, Social Networking Eclipses E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, 
at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/technology/internet/18drill.html; Dave 
Rosenberg, Twitters and Blogs: Post Once and Bail Out, CNET NEWS (June 9, 
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13846_3-10260753-62.html (10% of users 
responsible for over 90% of tweets). 
17. See, e.g., Law School Hosts Panel on „Social Media as Evidence‟, UC 
DAVIS SCH. L. (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/news.aspx?id=2525 (“Now, thanks to 
Twitter, Facebook, text messaging and social media, a permanent record of 
the exact words exchanged often exists. This material can be introduced in 
court, complete with a time stamp showing when it happened.”). 
18. See, e.g., Pete Cashmore, Why Facebook‟s Privacy War Is Not Over, 
CNN.COM (May 27, 2010, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/05/27/facebook.privacy.war.cas
hmore/index.html (“If Facebook‟s mission is to build a „more open and 
connected world‟ in which users „share more,‟ doesn‟t this contradict the 
desire of some users to keep their information private?”). 
19. Cf. The TJ Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“Indeed in most 
cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never 
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be 
its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are 
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse 
their omission.”); Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. 1975) (An attorney‟s 
competence best measured by “such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers 
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the 
performance of the tasks which they undertake.”). 
20. See generally Debbie Ginsberg & Meg Kribble, The Social 
Networking Titans: Facebook and MySpace, LLRX.COM (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/facebookmyspace.htm; Dave Roos, How Social 
Networks Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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and nuanced issues will fall within the purview of expert or 
investigative assistance.21 For example, computer forensics can 
uncover evidence found in digital storage media, sociologists 
can explain online behavior, and linguists can interpret the 
codes and subtly of chat and profile postings.22 
The social media phenomenon is part of Web 2.0, i.e., the 
shifting of content from top-down publishing to user- and 
consumer-generated information; in other words, people 
powered publishing.23 Social networking is a fast growing 
segment of this media. In essence, SNSs are “web-based 
 
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/how-social-networks-work.htm (last 
visited July 28, 2010). 
21. See, e.g., Applied Discovery Introduces New E-Discovery Consulting 
Service to Help Corporations Assess, Mitigate, and Manage Social Media 




22. See Ken Strutin, Internet Behavior and Expert Evidence, N.Y. L.J., 
Nov. 4, 2008, at 5 (“Web-based criminal cases bring judges and jurors into 
contact with an enigmatic Internet culture. A clear understanding of cyber-
behavior is crucial to assessing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit 
or the merits of a defense at trial. And misconceptions about Internet 
conduct, in some instances, may be explained or dispelled by expert 
evidence.”); see, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Twitter Expert Will Testify 
Against Courtney Love in Defamation Trial, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:31 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/twitter_expert_will_testify_against_c
ourtney_love_in_defamation_trial/. 
23. The need of members of a society to communicate, to extend their 
personal narratives into cyberspace and assume new personae online may 
have its origins in the beginnings of Western drama—when performances 
evolved from communal rituals involving everyone into plays performed 
exclusively by actors. According to one historian, more than 2,000 years ago, 
the seeds of modern drama started with the exploration of “new dimensions 
of experience” and the emergence of individual performers pretending to be 
other people, and finally, the separation of the audience from the 
performance where “one part of the community was addressing another part.” 
See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE 
IMAGINATION 207, 209 (1993). This fundamental transformation giving rise to 
personal expression, or “microtheater,” is occurring anew online. See, e.g., 
John Carroll & David Cameron, Drama, Digital Pre-Text and Social Media, 
14 RES. IN DRAMA EDUC. 295 (2009) (“The techniques used for the 
development of the digital pre-text for this project are based on facilitator-
generated online social networking and mobile media content. This approach 
generates the students‟ examination of mistaken identity as a platform for a 
classroom exploration of Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night.”) 
9
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services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view 
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system.”24 
The core ingredients of these sites are their individual user 
profiles (information storage and publication) and 
communication tools: 
 
While SNSs have implemented a wide 
variety of technical features, their backbone 
consists of visible profiles that display an 
articulated list of Friends who are also users of 
the system. Profiles are unique pages where one 
can „type oneself into being.‟ After joining an 
SNS, an individual is asked to fill out forms 
containing a series of questions. The profile is 
generated using the answers to these questions, 
which typically include descriptors such as age, 
location, interests, and an „about me‟ section. 
Most sites also encourage users to upload a 
profile photo. Some sites allow users to enhance 
their profiles by adding multimedia content or 
modifying their profile‟s look and feel. Others, 
such as Facebook, allow users to add modules 
(“Applications”) that enhance their profile.25 
 
For purposes of the penal law, the value of a 
communication/information source is measured by the need to 
control access to it.26 Access to social media has been found to 
be important enough to be blocked as a condition of 
punishment. For example, Victor L, a juvenile delinquent and 
acknowledged gang member, pled guilty to a weapons offense 
 
24. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 9. 
25. Id. (citations omitted). 
26. See generally Ken Strutin, No-Computer Sentencing, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 
11, 2005, at 5 (discussing the limits of banning access to the Internet, 
computers or even television as a condition of probation or post-release 
supervision). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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in a California court.27 He was sentenced to probation, which 
included interdicting access to MySpace.28 Specifically, the 
terms of his probation limiting Internet usage stated: “The 
Minor shall not access or participate in any Social Networking 
Site, including but not limited to Myspace.com.”29 In a post-
conviction proceeding, he challenged the condition, as well as 
several others, as vague and overbroad. However, the purpose 
behind this particular restriction was to “limit Victor‟s access to 
the Internet in ways designed to minimize the temptation to 
contact his gang friends or to otherwise use the computer for 
illegal purposes by requiring adult supervision whenever he 
goes online.”30 Therefore, the condition survived constitutional 
scrutiny, in contrast to other cases, with terms totally banning 
Internet use or access, which did not.31 
The case of Victor L spearheads the judicial recognition of 
SNSs as communication media which can be monitored. Other 
cases involving social media have focused on its impact as 
 
27. In re Victor L., 182 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (1st Dist. 2010). 
28. Id. at 909. 
29. Id. at 923. 
30. Id. at 926. 
31. Courts seem to be split on the appropriateness of lifetime or 
conditional Internet bans as a term of probation or supervised release. 
Compare United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We do 
not hold that limited Internet bans of shorter duration can never be imposed 
as conditions of supervised release for this type of conduct, but when placed 
within the context of related precedents, the unconditional, lifetime ban 
imposed by the District Court in this case is so broad and insufficiently 
tailored as to constitute „plain error.‟ We thus hold that this ban involved a 
„greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.‟ 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d)(2).”) with United States v. Fortenberry, 350 F. App‟x 906, 911 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (“Although we recognize the conditional ban on the internet usage 
for a lifetime is a harsh condition of supervised release, we cannot say that 
Fortenberry has demonstrated that imposition of the same was plainly 
erroneous.”). See generally Robin Miller, Validity of Condition of Probation, 
Supervised Release, or Parole Restricting Computer Use or Internet Access, 4 
A.L.R.6TH 1 (2005); David Kravetz, U.S. Courts Split on Internet Bans, WIRED 
MAG. (Jan. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/courts-split-on-internet-bans/ 
(“[A]ppellate courts are all over the map when it comes to internet bans often 
imposed on defendants, especially sex deviants, once they have served their 
time. What‟s more, the courts appear to be accepting the internet as a basic 
freedom to which convicts, even the worst of the worst, usually should not be 
denied permanent access.”). 
11
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evidence at trial, including its utilization during the 
commission of a crime,32 creating a virtual crime scene,33 and 
enhancing criminal sentences.34 
 
II.  The Illusion of Privacy 
 
The tension in social networking investigations is in 
drawing the line between public and private information. While 
 
32. See, e.g., Hoover Police Capture Two Suspected Facebook Bandits, 
MYFOXAL.COM (July 31, 2009, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.myfoxal.com/global/story.asp?s=10825881 (In Alabama, burglars 
checked Facebook pages to see who was on vacation to lineup their targets); 
Chris Matyszczyk, Facebook Break Leads to Burglary Suspect, CNET NEWS 
(Sept. 17, 2009, 4:27 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10356117-
71.html (In Virginia, a burglar checked his Facebook page in the victim‟s 
home during the break-in); MySpace Pics Lead to Burglary Bust, ABC-7.COM 
(Aug. 3, 2009, 6:22 PM), http://www.abc-7.com/Global/story.asp?S=10840135 
(Burglars in Florida posted pictures online in which they were posing with 
the stolen goods). Notably, Louisiana has enacted a law punishing the 
“[u]nlawful posting of criminal activity for notoriety and publicity.” LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:107.4(A) (“It shall be unlawful for a person who is either a 
principal or accessory to a crime to obtain an image of the commission of the 
crime using any camera, videotape, photo-optical, photo-electric, or any other 
image recording device and to transfer that image obtained during the 
commission of the crime by the use of a computer online service, Internet 
service, or any other means of electronic communication, including but not 
limited to a local bulletin board service, Internet chat room, electronic mail, 
or online messaging service for the purpose of gaining notoriety, publicity, or 
the attention of the public.”). 
33. See, e.g., Barbie Nadeau & Christopher Dickey, Murder Most Wired, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 2007, at 51 (The investigation into the murder of a British 
college student in Italy wended its way through familiar social media such as 
Skype phone calls, photos, stories appearing on Facebook profiles, and a 
YouTube video); Nicholas Riccardi, Criminal Charge Filed in Libel Case, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A10, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/04/nation/na-craigslist-libel4 (During a 
visitation dispute, a 40-year-old man allegedly posted comments about his 
former girlfriend on Craigslist Rants and Raves Forum. The state of Colorado 
charged him with criminal libel.). 
34. See, e.g., Eric Tucker, Social Networking Puts the Bite on Defendants, 
LAW.COM (July 22, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242314
5595 (DWI defendants involved in crashes that resulted in serious injuries or 
death were disappointed to learn that pictures of themselves mocking or 
flaunting their actions, posted on Facebook or MySpace, had been provided to 
the court at sentencing.). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
240 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
 
the scope of privacy expectations are being debated and argued 
in the courts, the public side of the online world is being 
archived and retransmitted without limit. The privacy dilemma 
lies at the center of a triangle formed by the private enclaves 
envisioned in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments; service 
providers‟ terms of service agreements (TOS) and their 
definitions of privacy; and the meaning of “reasonableness” as 
expressed in the practices and habits of millions of online 
users. 
The Wayback Machine,35 which harvests much of the 
public side of the Internet, is almost two petabytes of data in 
size and growing at a rate of twenty terabytes per month.36 The 
Library of Congress announced that it will be archiving all 
public tweets since Twitter started operation in March 2006.37 
The impetus behind Congress‟ effort was to gather legal blogs, 
websites of candidates for national office, and websites of 
Members of Congress and capture a snapshot of public life 
expressed through tweets to the tune of 167 terabytes. 
Presently, there are no legal or ethical38 constraints on public 
 
35. About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE, 
http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Aug. 13, 2010) (“The 
Internet Archive is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that was founded to build an 
Internet library. Its purposes include offering permanent access for 
researchers, historians, scholars, people with disabilities, and the general 
public to historical collections that exist in digital format.”). 
36. See Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET ARCHIVE, 
http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“How 
large is the Wayback Machine? The Internet Archive Wayback Machine 
contains almost 2 petabytes of data and is currently growing at a rate of 20 
terabytes per month. This eclipses the amount of text contained in the 
world's largest libraries, including the Library of Congress.”). 
37. Matt Raymond, How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter 
Archive, LIBR. CONG. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/how-tweet-it-is-library-acquires-entire-twitter-
archive/. 
38. See Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-164 
(2005), http://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2005-164.pdf (“Accessing an 
adversary‟s public Web site is no different from reading a magazine article or 
purchasing a book written by that adversary. Because the risks that Oregon 
RPC 4.2 seeks to avoid are not implicated by such activities, no Oregon RPC 
4.2 violation would arise from such electronic access. A lawyer who reads 
information posted for general public consumption simply is not 
communicating with the represented owner of the Web site.”). 
13
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web searching, which includes blogs or personal websites. 
But how do privacy settings and terms of service affect the 
expectation of privacy in social media? The existence of privacy 
in social media is a key question under codes of ethics and 
discovery rules. If the expectation is that online profiles are as 
private as a person‟s home, desk drawer, or combination safe, 
then pretexting by private parties becomes problematic.39 
However, this protean media does not offer clarity in its 
definitions of privacy,40 and those definitions change with 
advances in technology and public outcry.41 Meanwhile, courts 
and ethics committees are relying on subjective expectations to 
define privacy in social space.42 
 
39. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 577 (2005); Ken Strutin, Pretexting, Legal Ethics and Social 
Networking Sites, LLRX.COM (Oct. 5, 2009), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/pretexting.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) 
(summarizing current case law and literature on pretexting). 
40. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, 
RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007), available at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb /dsolove/Future-of-Reputation/text.htm. 
41. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2010 (Magazine), at MM30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com /2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html (“All around 
the world, political leaders, scholars and citizens are searching for responses 
to the challenge of preserving control of our identities in a digital world that 
never forgets. Are the most promising solutions going to be technological? 
Legislative? Judicial? Ethical? A result of shifting social norms and cultural 
expectations? Or some mix of the above?”); Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, 
Answering Privacy Concerns With New Settings, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, 
at A19, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010 
/05/23/AR2010052303828.html (“We have heard the feedback. There needs to 
be a simpler way to control your information. In the coming weeks, we will 
add privacy controls that are much simpler to use. We will also give you an 
easy way to turn off all third-party services.”); Cecilia Kang, Senate Online 
Privacy Hearing to Draw FTC, FCC Chairs, Google, Apple and Facebook, 
WASH. POST BLOG (July 23, 2010, 11:40 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/the_senate_commerce_co
mmittees.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“Analysts said greater focus from 
Congress on online privacy has led Web sites and online ad networks to move 
toward self-regulation to fend off legislation. This self-regulation is aimed at 
greater disclosure on Web sites that consumers are being tracked, and an 
easy mechanism for opting out.”). 
42. See generally SOCIAL NETWORKING PRIVACY, 
http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (collection of 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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Social media are analogous to open mikes. However, the 
unguarded remarks of millions who publish their thoughts, 
criticisms, and gossip on personal profiles are made under an 
assumed veil of privacy. The public privacy of social networking 
has not yet been clearly assigned a specific level of First, 
Fourth, or Fifth Amendment protections,43 nor has it been 
given a place among the privileges in the Rules of Evidence.44 
The security of information posted on third-party host sites is 
defined by those sites, their terms of agreements, their privacy 
settings, and most importantly the discretion of visitors who 
can read, copy, and republish without limit. When e-mail gaffes 
gained prominence, a rule of thumb emerged cautioning users 
not put anything into an e-mail that they would not want to see 
printed on the front page of the New York Times.45 No such 
 
litigation and public debate about the problems and violations of consumer 
expectations in online privacy). 
43. See Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, 
Technology and the Constitution, 7 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL‟Y 123, 191-92 
(2002), available at http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol7/issue2/brenner.pdf 
(“The First Amendment protects the privacy of the identity and associates of 
an individual; the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the activities of 
an individual; and the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of the thoughts 
of an individual. The degree to which they protect these different privacy 
interests has evolved significantly since Justices Brandeis and Warren wrote 
in 1890. This evolution is directly attributable to the increased sophistication 
and proliferation of technology. This evolution is also responsible for the shift 
from the Olmstead holding to the Katz holding. When the decision was made 
by [the] Olmstead Court, wiretaps were in their infancy and were therefore 
an exceedingly uncommon event. By the time the decision was made by the 
Katz Court, surveillance technology had become very sophisticated, due in 
large part to advances made during World War II, and the ability of the 
government to spy on the activities of people had become a matter of public 
concern. In changing the focus of the privacy protections of the Fourth 
Amendment from places to people, the Katz Court sought to create a more 
dynamic standard, one that could be used to address the increasing 
invasiveness made possible by technology.”). 
44. Id. at 137 (“By the time the Twenty-First Century dawned, 
cyberspace had become an important new venue for mankind's activities, licit 
and illicit. The rise and proliferation of cybercrime raised new problems for 
law enforcement, both with the enforcement of existing substantive laws 
against conduct vectored through cyberspace and also in the gathering of 
evidence without violating the existing privacy standards.”). 
45. See E-Mail Etiquette, JOB-HUNT.ORG, http://www.job-
hunt.org/onlinejobsearchguide/article_e-mail_etiquette.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2010) (“Golden rule of e-mail - Don't put anything in an e-mail that 
15
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common wisdom has arisen to chasten people from putting up 
pictures and videos showing questionable judgment or criminal 
behavior. In George Orwell‟s 1984, it was Big Brother that 
carried the burden and expense of mass surveillance, but in 
Web 2.0 surveillance starts from the ground up.46 The divide 
between consumer privacy expectations in social networking 
and the legal recognition of these interests might be informed 
by the ongoing challenges to e-mail privacy. 
Electronic mail is not the equivalent of traditional mail or 
even a landline phone call. One author has likened e-mails to a 
postcard47 and pointed out that the privacy expectations in this 
format are declining. In his review of recent New York 
decisions, he suggested that the perception of e-mail privacy 
hinged on the degree of protections that the sender was willing 
to take: 
 
Courts ask, for instance, does a sender leave 
his or her e-mail account “open” on a computer 
for others to see or access? Courts also look to 
whether the e-mail is sent or received via a 
corporate system or through a personal account; 
whether the computer used for such 
communication is owned by an employer or an 
individual; and whether, when the 
communication was transmitted, the computer at 
issue was located in a company‟s office or at a 
home?48 
 
you wouldn't be comfortable having your Mother or your boss - or the person 
you may be writing about - read on the front page of The New York Times or 
The Wall Street Journal.”). 
46. See Ken Strutin, Social Networking Evidence in a Self-Surveillance 
Society, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 2009, at 5 (describes the evolution of mass self-
surveillance and lifelogging prompted by social media technology and services 
and the legal implications). 
47. See Mark A. Berman, Expectations of Privacy in E-Mail 
Communications, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2010 (“E-mails should more properly be 
viewed as a „postcard‟ or a conversation over a speakerphone, both open and 
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In addition to personal user habits, other factors include 
the existence of passwords, encryption, or security measures 
taken by the employer or individual. The prevalence of shared 
access to accounts by couples, employees, or in other situations 
where consent to use the e-mail or a waiver of permission to 
view exists is an increasingly significant detail.49 
E-mail, like social media, is hosted or transits through a 
third party‟s site. The expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment when e-mail contents are gleaned from an 
Internet Service Provider is being hotly debated. In Warshak v. 
United States,50 the government was investigating Steven 
Warshak for wire fraud and money laundering. They obtained 
two ex parte orders under the Stored Communications Act (18 
U.S.C. § 2703) (“SCA”) to search plaintiff e-mails, including 
those stored on the Yahoo service. After nearly a year, the 
government notified Warshak about the orders. As a result, 
Warshak sought an injunction barring the government from 
any more ex parte e-mail searches or for using those e-mails for 
any purpose without a search warrant. The District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio granted Warshak‟s motion for a 
preliminary injunction in part, stating: 
 
The United States is accordingly [enjoined], 
pending final judgment on the merits of 
Plaintiffs‟ claims, from seizing, pursuant to court 
order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the contents of 
any personal e-mail account maintained by an 
Internet Service Provider in the name of any 
resident of the Southern District of Ohio without 
providing the relevant account holder or 
subscriber prior notice and an opportunity to be 
heard on any complaint, motion, or other 
 
49. See, e.g., Boudakian v. Boudakian, 240 N.Y. L.J. 123 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 
2008) (finding the defendant did not have expectation of privacy in e-mail 
account accessible through family computer). 
50. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006). 
17
2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES 245 
 
pleading seeking issuance of such an order.51 
 
In granting relief, the judge made an important 
observation about the nature of privacy in electronically 
communicated media: 
 
While the Court is prepared to reconsider its 
views upon the presentation of further evidence 
on these points, it is not persuaded—as an initial 
matter—that an individual surrenders his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal 
e-mails once he allows those e-mails (or 
electronic copies thereof) to be stored on a 
subscriber account maintained on the server of a 
commercial ISP. As such, the Court finds that 
Warshak has shown a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits of his Fourth Amendment 
claim.52 
 
However, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not believe that 
the constitutionality of the SCA‟s delayed notification 
provision53 and the question of whether e-mail passing through 
the hands of third party hosts engendered a reasonable 




51. Id. at *33. 
52. Id. at *19 (footnotes omitted). 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (“A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, 
only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued 
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A 
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the 
means available under subsection (b) of this section.”). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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Our reluctance to hypothesize how the 
government might conduct a conjectural search 
of Warshak‟s e-mails, then resolve the 
constitutionality of that search as well as any 
others the government might conduct under the 
statute, is reinforced by another reality: The 
Stored Communications Act has been in 
existence since 1986 and to our knowledge has 
not been the subject of any successful Fourth 
Amendment challenges, in any context, whether 
to § 2703(d) or to any other provision. If it “is 
often true” that reviewing “legislation in advance 
of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a 
concrete case involves too remote and abstract an 
inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial 
function,” the same is assuredly true when we 
have no precedent to guide us. Discretion, 
indeed, is the better part of valor.54 
 
While e-mail is akin to a phone call or private 
correspondence, social networking has an entirely different set 
of rules. Privacy in social media seems to be a fluctuating 
concept depending on the circumstances.55 The presence of that 
information on a third-party site, a form of personal cloud 
computing,56 is an important factor. Social media is different 
 
54. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(internal citations omitted). 
55. See, e.g., Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N. P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44-45 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“The MySpace.com webpage that triggers Yath‟s claim 
[invasion of privacy--publication of private facts] was such a site. Access to it 
was not protected, as some web pages are, by a password or some other 
restrictive safeguard. It was a window that Yath‟s enemies propped open for 
at least 24 hours allowing any internet-connected voyeur access to private 
details of her life. The claim therefore survives the „publicity‟ challenge.” 
However, “[b]ecause Yath failed to produce any evidence on an essential 
element of her claim—specifically, that any of the defendants surviving on 
appeal were involved in creating or sustaining the disparaging MySpace.com 
webpage—her invasion-of-privacy claim fails.”). 
56. See Shane Schick, Head in the Clouds? Welcome to the Future, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Toronto), May 29, 2007, available at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs /article799712.ece (“Cloud computing 
19
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from traditional mail, electronic mail, telephone calls, and 
telefacsimiles. Those familiar forms of communication transit 
through third party sites that incidentally and temporarily 
store information, contrasted with social networking services 
that are designed to store information as if they were a 
personal computer. Furthermore, social media is distinct from 
other mediums of communication because of its unique 
information sharing capabilities and the risks of unrestrained 
republication of personal data. In answering the questions of 
whether something offsite was realistically meant to be private, 
the terms of service, user expectations, webware, and current 
practices must all be examined. 
There appears to be conflict in the approaches to social 
media privacy. People want to be popular and connected, while 
at the same time reserve their right to selectively fence off 
their activities.57 In other words, they want to have their cake 
 
is essentially a large-scale distributed computing system that taps into the 
vast resources of the Internet. Individual PCs access the „cloud‟ of data rather 
than their own data centre and rent products or services such as extra 
storage space or applications from companies like Amazon.com or Google.”). 
57. See James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER 
L.J. 793, 800 (2010) (“The point is not that these „Digital Natives‟ prize 
privacy above all else or that they experience privacy in the same way 
previous generations did or that the social content of privacy is stable. The 
privacy they care about is social and relational, perhaps less concerned with 
databases and governmental surveillance than their parents‟ and 
grandparents‟ privacy. They are constantly trading their privacy off against 
other social opportunities and making pragmatic judgment calls about what 
to reveal and what to keep hidden. However, they do care about privacy, and 
they act accordingly.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally MARY MADDEN & 
AARON SMITH, REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 2-3 (2010), 
available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Reputation_Manage
ment_with_topline.pdf (“The increased prevalence of self-monitoring and 
observation of others creates a dynamic environment where people promote 
themselves or shroud themselves depending on their intended audience and 
circumstances. There are good reasons to be more vigilant. Online reputation 
matters; 44% of online adults have searched for information about someone 
whose services or advice they seek in a professional capacity. People are now 
more likely to work for an employer that has policies about how they present 
themselves online, and co-workers and business competitors now keep closer 
tabs on one another. Those who are dating are more likely to research their 
potential mates online. And even neighbors have become more curious about 
finding information about one another online. Yet, even those who are careful 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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and eat it too. Without specific remedies, they are left to 
regulate themselves, which can lead to posting false 
information online, a behavior that ethics committees, 
prosecutors, and service providers try to prohibit. However, 
this identity masking is sometimes the result of people trying 
to protect their reputations. 
Compromising photos, ill-considered rants, or “what was I 
thinking moments” recorded and posted impulsively might end 
up in a human resources file58 or before a university 
admissions committee. College-bound students have begun 
creating profiles with aliases to avoid being linked to a youthful 
indiscretion that they would not want a college recruiter to 
see.59 And one scholar has pointed out how much further the 
masking goes: 
 
[A]s soon as you scratch beneath the surface of 
Facebook social practices, carefully modulated 
 
about their own disclosures have to stay on top of the identifying material 
that others may have posted about them on social networking profiles, photo- 
and video-sharing sites, Twitter and blogs.”). 
58. See, e.g., Emma Barnett, Facebook Users Concerned About Privacy, 
Says Survey, TELEGRAPH, April 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7635125/Facebook-users-
concerned-about-privacy-says-survey.html (“F-Secure, an internet security 
firm which polled 450 Facebook users, found that 73 per cent were not 
„friends‟ with their boss on the site. The survey also found that 77 per cent 
said that they use the site‟s privacy tools to safeguard their private 
information. The poll discovered that Facebook users have become 
increasingly aware of the need to ensure their personal information and 
status updates remain private with 35 per cent of pollsters admitting posting 
something on the site they later regretted.”). 
59. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, An Online Alias Keeps Colleges Off Their 
Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at ST8, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/ fashion/25Noticed.html (“Michael 
Goldman, who graduated last year from the Frisch School in Paramus, N.J., 
estimated that nearly half his friends changed their Facebook names in the 
last two years of high school. „At this point it‟s not done as much for the sake 
for being functional,‟ Mr. Goldman said. „Now it‟s gotten just more to be 
trendy.‟ Once they are accepted, most revert to their actual names. Kwame 
Kruw Ocran, a senior at Brooklyn Technical High School, thinks hiding 
behind a pseudonym isn‟t safe enough. He held a cleanse week last summer, 
where via Facebook he encouraged more than 1,000 of his fellow students to 
remove anything incriminating from their online profiles before applying to 
colleges.”). 
21
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privacy management is everywhere, Danah Boyd 
has documented how teens on Facebook, 
MySpace, and other social media use fake 
profiles, fake names, fake ages, and a cloud of 
other minor lies to keep their profiles safe from 
prying (usually parental) eyes while also 
connecting with their peers. Meanwhile, college 
students coming back from a night of partying 
have learned that the first thing they need to do 
is check Facebook and untag their names from 
any photos of them doing keg stands, lest their 
athletic coaches or campus police catch them 
drinking.60 
 
In addition, false profiling or concealment can complicate 
the prosecution and adjudication of criminal cases. For 
example, threatening, harassing, and fake messages or 
contacts can be conducted through a phony profile. And this 
creates a serious concern in domestic violence cases, where the 
free range of Facebook and MySpace can allow any 
unauthenticated person to pose as anyone and make contact 
with a victim.61 
 
60. Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 799-800 (footnotes omitted). 
61. See Laurie L. Baughman, Friend Request or Foe? Confirming the 
Misuse of Internet and Social Networking Sites by Domestic Violence 
Perpetrators, 19 WIDENER L.J. 933, 944 (2010) (“Because social networking 
sites allow individuals to freely post photos, comments, and other personal 
information, a new wealth of information is placed at the fingertips of 
abusers. Even if the victim does not post personal content on the Internet and 
does not have a page of his or her own, an abuser may be able to track down 
the previously unknown location of a victim if a family member, child, or 
friend posts a picture or other personal information about the victim and/or 
the victim's children online. Privacy settings allow users to limit the 
availability of their information to certain friends or family members, rather 
than the general public. However, a simple search of a social networking site 
allows an abuser to access information about a victim without approved 
access to the victim's profile or page. Additionally, social networking sites run 
on the honor system. The sites do not check into whether a user who creates a 
profile is in fact a real person, so the creation of a fake profile is as easy as 
the creation of a real profile. A fake profile may allow an abuser to access the 
site of a victim or victim's family member, when an authentic profile would 
act as a red flag.”) (footnotes omitted). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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These behaviors illustrate that social media participants 
have a different impression of privacy than they would expect 
in a sealed envelope, a phone call, or the contents of their own 
hard drive. They want privacy but on their own terms.62 Social 
and private are usually antithetical ideas, particularly online. 
And if the membership of a social media service treats identity 
deception as an accepted and necessary practice, or as 
ungovernable, then pretexting by lawyers63 and investigators 
might fall within the mores of that online society. 
 
III.  Discovery 
 
The propriety of entering the fenced off portions of 
cyberspace in pursuit of litigation ends has kicked up a storm 
of reactions. Federal and state legislatures are scrambling to 
enact or amend laws to adjust to this new media, filling gaps in 
criminal behavior, e.g., cyberbullying,64 and addressing the 
 
62. Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 800 (“The point is not that these 
„Digital Natives‟ prize privacy above all else or that they experience privacy 
in the same way previous generations did or that the social content of privacy 
is stable. The privacy they care about is social and relational, perhaps less 
concerned with databases and governmental surveillance than their parents‟ 
and grandparents‟ privacy. They are constantly trading their privacy off 
against other social opportunities and making pragmatic judgment calls 
about what to reveal and what to keep hidden. However, they do care about 
privacy, and they act accordingly.”). 
63. Considering the unknown degree of deception, puffing, and 
exaggeration that users engage in, information quality also becomes an 
important, separate issue. But the first step is gaining access to the witness, 
whose evidence can be evaluated later in the crucible of the courtroom. See 
Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What‟s Evidence Between „Friends‟?, BOSTON 




64. See Kristopher Accardi, Is Violating an Internet Service Provider‟s 
Terms of Service an Example of Computer Fraud and Abuse?: An Analytical 
Look at the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Lori Drew‟s Conviction and 
Cyberbullying, 37 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 68-70 (2009) (describes the 
distinctions among the new types of offenses aimed at abusive behavior 
conducted through electronic media, i.e., cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and 
cyberharassment). 
23
2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES 251 
 
basics of procedure, e.g., service of process.65 The equation of 
social networking sites with recognized forms of 
communication has opened the door to legal process and might 
support the legitimacy of other actions, such as pretrial 
discovery by private parties. 
Facebook and MySpace have become social replay for 
hundreds of millions of people, where the data of their lives can 
be viewed and reviewed at will. And one of the core features of 
these sites is communication. The legal system places a 
premium on modes of communication, which opens up a host of 
applications in criminal and civil practice, from search 
warrants to starting a civil action. For instance, service of 
process, the act of providing an opposing party with notice of an 
action, has evolved constitutionally with technology changes. 
At the heart of effective service are methods “reasonably 
calculated” to reach the parties in interest.66 From manually 
handing a notice and complaint to a person in the forum state 
to nail, mail, and file to telex, fax, text messaging, e-mail, and 
even television,67 courts have recognized these modes as 
acceptable under due process and statutory standards—neither 
of which ever contemplated electronic service of process.68 The 
underlying rationale behind the due process evolution of forms 
of service has been the unavailability of traditional formats, 
and widespread use and acceptance of new communication 
 
65. See generally Andriana L. Shultz, Superpoked and Served: Service of 
Process Via Social Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497 (2009) 
(discusses the evolution of service of process founded on due process and 
statutory procedures and leading to the recognition of Facebook and other 
media as court approved methods). 
66. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 
67. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. 01 CIV 10132(HB), 
01 CIV 10144(HB), 2001 WL 1658211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) 
(“Service by Smith and Doe on Bin Laden will be by publication for six (6) 
weeks in all of the following media outlets: (1) Afghani newspapers Hewad, 
Anis, Kabul News, and the Kabul Times; (2) Pakistani newspaper Wahat, the 
paper in which Bin Laden has published his Fatwahs; and (3) broadcasters Al 
Jazeera, Turkish CNN, BBC World, ARN, and ADF.”) (emphasis added). 
68. Shultz, supra note 65, at 1503-07. 
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technologies. In the right cases, unprecedented applications of 
new media might be sanctioned as a new approach “reasonably 
calculated” to serve process, and opens the door to applying 
them in other legal procedures.69 
The most prominent example of social networking as 
communication conduit is the newly recognized use of Facebook 
for service of process. At the forefront, Australia‟s courts have 
approved contact through a person‟s profile as sufficient to 
satisfy the standards for serving notice, complaints and orders. 
In each case, social networking was the only, and as it turned 
out best, option available. 
In the first reported case of its kind, an Australian court 
endorsed Facebook communication as a means of satisfying the 
notice requirements for a default judgment.70 A master of the 
Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory reached 
beyond the furthest ends of civil procedure to recognize this 
new form of substituted service. “Master Harper ordered that 
the defendants in the case could be validly served by the 
plaintiff sending a message by computer to the Facebook pages 
of both defendants informing them of the entry of and the 
terms of the judgment.”71 
Two years later, another Australian litigant was granted 
relief through Facebook. A Sydney woman tried to obtain a 
paternity test from an elusive man, called Mr. Howard, whom 
 
69. Id. at 1523 (“Courts that have upheld as constitutional service of 
process through new communication technologies generally have begun by 
noting the widespread societal embrace of the technology in other facets of 
life. In theory, this should have virtually no bearing on whether service is 
upheld in a given case because due process analyses in this context are, by 
nature, fact specific. In other words, the fact that the technology is widely 
employed in the community at large does not entail that it is reasonably 
calculated to provide the particular defendant notice. What is good for the 
goose is not always good for the gander. Nonetheless, even assuming that 
widespread use plays a role in the court's decision, Facebook could reasonably 
be taken as widespread enough to gain approval.”) (Footnotes omitted). 
70. Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves Documents via Facebook, 
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she claimed was the father.72 Her letters went unanswered, 
efforts to contact him through his parents and girlfriend failed, 
and the process server was unsuccessful. Although his physical 
address was in flux, his Facebook profile was stable and 
routinely used. The woman‟s solicitor informed Federal 
Magistrate Brown that a “private message” could be sent to the 
man‟s online account. Satisfied with the efficacy of this form of 
service, the court granted an order to serve the documents via 
Facebook.73 
After receiving the documents, Mr. Howard promptly 
closed his Facebook and MySpace profiles. Nonetheless, the 
court imposed an order of paternity and child support on Mr. 
Howard, since he had been properly served. In the light of this 
second decision affirming legal process through social 
networking, Dr. Tim Butcher, a senior lecturer at the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology, observed: “People are 
finding new ways to use social media every day,” he said. “It‟s 
only natural that courts, businesses, government agencies will 
use these tools to track us down. You have the world at your 
fingertips—but the flip side is that people can find us as 
well.”74 
The e-service precedent begins to marshal support for 
other direct legal applications of Facebook, MySpace, and 
Twitter on the same grounds as other communication media. In 
these cases, the courts have approved private litigants 
accessing an opposing party‟s social networking profile to 
ascertain identity and the stability of the site for accepting 
communications. And it makes sense that a network like 
Facebook, with 500 million profiles, is viewed as a reliable 
channel for communication; indeed it is the reason the 
 
72. Kim Arlington, Court Uses Facebook to Serve Paternity Test Order, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/court-uses-facebook-to-
serve-paternity-test-order-20100603-x7dc.html. 
73. Id. (“In a recently published judgment, delivered in Adelaide, Mr. 
Brown said he was satisfied Mr. Howard had been properly served with the 
documents and inferred Mr. Howard wanted no involvement as „the 
parentage test can have only one outcome because he is [the child‟s] father.‟”). 
74. Id. 
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company is in business.75  
However, there has been no mention of the mechanism by 
which this information had been obtained. Did the plaintiffs 
already have accounts and use their privileges as members to 
unearth the data or did they do it surreptitiously, using a fake 
profile or a legitimate one that masked their purpose? Mr. 
Howard did not hesitate to take down his profiles after being 
served, indicating that he would not have willingly accepted a 
“Friend” request from a woman or her representative seeking a 
paternity test. So it is unclear what actions the lawyers, 
investigators, or plaintiffs undertook to complete service. 
It is significant that the parties being reached could not be 
contacted through traditional means. Social media became the 
sole and best choice in these circumstances. Similarly, 
information impeaching a witness or providing leads to 
exculpatory evidence might only be found in unique places like 
Facebook or MySpace. Someone‟s online profile might be the 
only place that an inconsistent statement or contradictory 
version of testimony can be found, or even a confession pointing 
to someone else‟s guilt. For this reason alone, the “uniqueness” 
of the evidence source, social media investigation warrants 
legal and ethical sanction.76 
Confirming the identification of the profile‟s owner, 
confronting privacy limitations and terms of service 
restrictions, and analyzing ethical rules about using deception 
or providing false statements are all issues to be considered in 
 
75. “Facebook‟s mission is to give people the power to share and make 
the world more open and connected.” FACEBOOK.COM, 
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf/r.php?locale=en_US#!/facebook?v=i
nfo&ref=pf%2Fr.php%3Flocale%3Den_US (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
76. Schultz, supra note 65, at 1528 (“The Australian case permitting 
service of a default judgment via Facebook foreshadows future attempts to 
employ social networking sites to effectuate legal ends. As this comment 
illustrates, attempted service of process through Facebook may very well be 
permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) for serving foreign defendants, and such 
service does not appear to constitute a per se due process violation, no matter 
how narrow the circumstances permitting such service might be. Necessity, 
the mother of invention, has frequently been the catalyst for adapting the law 
to implement new technologies, and if a situation arises in which a message 
sent via Facebook is the only available means to serve an elusive defendant 
abroad, the law might, in due time, adapt accordingly.”) (footnote omitted). 
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online investigations. At the same time, courts and legislators 
ought to recognize the unqualified necessity of using social 
media as a foundation for discovery and case preparation. The 
principal concern in most cases is the destruction of ephemeral 
evidence. 
 
IV.  Spoliation: Preservation of Evidence 
 
To address spoliation, one approach would be to seek an ex 
parte discovery order from the trial court, like a protective 
order, requiring that the party‟s or witness‟ profile be frozen 
and downloaded.77 The order might be addressed to either the 
person who posted the profile or the network provider that 
hosts it. The profile‟s contents should be reviewed in camera to 
confirm identifying information, a preliminary issue linking 
the profile to the actual person, and then examined for content, 
e.g., exculpatory evidence, impeachment, or other relevant 
information.78 This preservation step will be crucial to 
safeguarding important and unique evidence. 
In People v. Hardaway,79 a Michigan defendant appealed 
his conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct claiming 
ineffectiveness of counsel, among other issues. The crux of the 
appeal was his attorney‟s failure to preserve the contents of the 
victim‟s social networking profile and use it for impeachment at 
 
77. See Lloyd S. van Oosternrijk, Comment, Paper or Plastic?: Electronic 
Discovery and Spoliation in the Digital Age, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1183 
(2005) (“Only a few state courts have addressed the unique role of electronic 
discovery in today‟s trials, but cost-shifting in electronic discovery cases has 
come into vogue in the federal arena. Generally speaking, the current Rule 
26(c) allows a responding party to seek a protective order shifting the cost of 
discovery when the cost would create an undue burden.”) (footnotes omitted). 
78. See, e.g., Leanne Italie, Divorce Lawyers: Facebook Tops in Online 
Evidence, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.mercurynews.com /business/ci_15429107 (“Oversharing on social 
networks has led to an overabundance of evidence in divorce cases. The 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers says 81 percent of its members 
have used or faced evidence plucked from Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and 
other social networking sites, including YouTube and LinkedIn, over the past 
five years.”). 
79. No. 284980, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1912, at *1 (Ct. App. Sept. 17, 
2009). 
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the bench trial: 
 
According to defendant, the web page would have 
established that the victim had a “pattern of 
lying” because the victim, on her MySpace page, 
claimed that she was 18 years old and married. 
Defendant also argues that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to inquire into the 
disappearance of the victim‟s MySpace page. 
Defendant claims that had counsel done so, 
counsel “may have been able” to establish a 
Brady violation.80 
 
By the trial date, the victim‟s online profile had 
disappeared, like Mr. Howard‟s. Nonetheless, the evidence 
came in through another route, and defendant‟s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was denied.81 Still, the question 
remains: what are an attorney‟s obligations under the 
Constitution and the Rules of Professional Conduct in this 
situation? 
If the privacy issue and terms of service hurdles were 
removed, then the duties of counsel and the court might be 
made clear. In Torres v. Lexington Insurance Co.,82 plaintiff 
claimed that she had been sexually assaulted during a massage 
she received at one of the defendants‟ hotel. Her complaint 
stated that “she suffered and continues to suffer intense mental 
anguish, feelings of shame, humiliation, depression, 
unworthiness, weeping and has been forced to undergo 
psychological treatment and therapy.”83 Attorneys for the 
 
80. Id. at *2-3 (footnote omitted). 
81. Id. at *2-3 (“However, the trier of fact knew what defendant argues 
the victim‟s MySpace page would have established—that the victim lied 
about her age and marital status. On cross-examination, the victim admitted 
that she lied on her MySpace page about her age and marital status. 
Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that if counsel had 
investigated the disappearance of the victim‟s MySpace page or presented the 
web page as evidence at trial, the result of defendant‟s trial would have been 
different.”). 
82. 237 F.R.D. 533 (P.R. 2006). 
83. Id. at 534. 
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defendants had learned independently, not through procedural 
discovery channels, that the plaintiff had several web pages 
“depicting an active social life, and an aspiring singing and 
modeling career.”84 Plaintiff and her counsel were unaware 
that these pages had been uncovered by the other side. The 
defendants downloaded and printed out most of their contents, 
and then notified plaintiff‟s counsel that “eliminating or 
altering the websites could be considered spoliation or evidence 
tampering.”85 Two days later, the web pages were gone without 
explanation. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the lawsuit or 
eliminate or reduce the damages. In response, the court 
ordered sanctions: 
 
In this case, Mrs. Torres did not make it known 
to defendants that she had an aspiring modeling 
or singing career. In fact, she attempted to depict 
the life of a recluse with no or little social 
interaction. Instead, Mrs. Torres led an active 
social life and announced this information to the 
world by posting it on very public internet sites. 
Then, immediately upon defendants‟ discovery of 
evidence, which could be used to contradict or 
impeach her allegations, Mrs. Torres removed 
the information from the internet. This is the 
type of unconscionable scheme the court seeks to 
deter.86 
 
To remedy the spoliation problem the judge made several 
decisions. He declined to dismiss the complaint or limit a 
finding on damages, but precluded plaintiff from introducing 
any evidence of mental anguish. Furthermore, he concluded 
that the defendants‟ actions in preserving the pages‟ contents 
by downloading and printing them out did not factor into the 
 
84. Id. at 533-34. See generally Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., 
Formal Op. 2005-164 (2005). 
85. Id. at 534. 
86. Id. 
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analysis.87 The court separated the action of evidence spoliation 
from the mechanics of investigating and uncovering the web 
content. This lends support to the idea that a court would be 
empowered to issue a sanctionable preservation order. In 
addition, it leaves for separate consideration the means for 
opposing counsel to discover the existence of an online profile. 
The public or private nature of the site would be the only fly in 
the ointment. 
The defense might make additional applications based on a 
due process right to present a defense88 to seek any data that 
might lead to additional evidence,89 such as a Friends list or 
references to Brady or Jencks90 material. While no published 
decision has yet concluded that a social networking profile 
contained Brady or Jencks‟ material or impeaching evidence, 
there is anecdotal evidence that it can. 
In New York City, a man was arrested for carrying a 
loaded weapon.91 The case rested on the credibility of the 
arresting officer. His online reputation became a central part of 
the defense when evidence from his Facebook page was used 
for impeachment. The defendant asserted that he had been 
 
87. Id. 
88. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (“The right to offer 
the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the 
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it 
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront 
the prosecution‟s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he 
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is 
a fundamental element of due process of law.”). 
89. This tocsin about preservation applies with equal force to the client‟s 
page. See, e.g., Damiano Beltrami, I‟m Innocent. Just Check My Status on 
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A27 (“[Rodney Bradford‟s] defense 
lawyer, Robert Reuland, told a Brooklyn assistant district attorney, Lindsay 
Gerdes, about the Facebook entry, which was made at the time of the 
robbery. The district attorney subpoenaed Facebook to verify that the words 
had been typed from a computer at an apartment at 71 West 118th Street in 
Manhattan, the home of Mr. Bradford‟s father. When that was confirmed, the 
charges were dropped.”). 
90. See generally John T. Bandler, The New York Rosario Rule Applied 
to Computerized Documents: The Rigid and Impractical Duplicative 
Equivalent Doctrine Requires Modification, 22 PACE L. REV. 407 (2002). 
91. See, e.g., Jim Dwier, The Officer Who Posted Too Much on MySpace, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A24. 
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stopped and assaulted by the officer and his partner (leaving 
him with three broken ribs); the officers then planted the gun 
to cover up their conduct. However, the jurors learned that the 
officer had set his Facebook page to “devious mood,” and that 
he had listed his status as watching the movie Training Day to 
“brush up on proper police procedure.” Ultimately, the 
defendant was acquitted of the gun charge, but convicted for 
resisting arrest.  
Defense counsel were led to the officer‟s profile from an 
Internet search92 that revealed statements he had made about 
video clips showing suspects being arrested, and in which he 
talked about “tuning up arrestees” before putting on the cuffs.93 
The online statements supported the defense‟s theory that the 
officer intended to cover-up his use of excessive force. However, 
there is no way to know exactly how the jurors processed this 
information because they acquitted on the principal felony 
charge but still convicted on resisting arrest. 
Nonetheless, any impeachment evidence has the potential 
of raising reasonable doubt. The question for the defense is how 
to find it and for the jury how to weigh it. Social media as 
evidence is inextricably tied to its discoverability, and will 
bring up questions of authenticity, weight, and credibility.94 
 
92. See generally CAROLE LEVITT & MARK ROSCH, FIND INFO LIKE A PRO, 
VOLUME 1: MINING THE INTERNET‟S PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH (2010); Tamara Thompson, Due Diligence with 
Social Networks: Benefits of This New Information Arena, 195 N.J. L.J. 302, 
Feb. 2, 2009. 
93. Injudicious statements and misuse of social media has sounded a 
warning bell in the law enforcement community, prompting a call for 
workplace standards. See Terrence P. Dwyer, Pitfalls for Police Officers on 
Facebook, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/off-
duty/articles/2304799-Pitfalls-for-police-officers-on-social-networking-sites/ 
(“Police administrators are well advised to adopt a social networking policy if 
they have not already started to do so. Police officers are advised to keep 
content unobjectionable at the least, but would be better off staying clear of 
online postings and video rants. The democratization of media use has 
created a „big brother‟ of monstrous proportions and can quickly become a 
trap for the careless officer.”). 
94. See generally Kamika Dunlap, Facebook Alibi: Social Media as 
Defense Evidence, FINDLAW BLOTTER (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:00 PM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2009/11/facebook-alibi-social-media-as-
defense-eviden ce.html (“Authenticating your Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, or 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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The prosecutor in the New York City case argued that the 
Training Day comments were protected speech, criticism of a 
movie, and irrelevant to the circumstances of the arrest. Still, 
the judge allowed the evidence in. Privacy, freedom of 
expression, and weight of the evidence are all factors that must 
be addressed in every instance where this type of self-published 
evidence will be used. Context is as important as content in the 
world of social media evidence. 
 
V.  Spoliation: Preserving Defense Evidence 
 
Before counsel has had an opportunity to review a client‟s 
social media profile, the government might already be aware of 
it and reveal its intent to use the contents through the normal 
course of discovery.95 In other words, law enforcement or the 
prosecution may have built their indictment on the material 
found on MySpace or Facebook during an investigation or 
before bringing formal charges.96 
In a computer-based crime, such as illicit pornography, a 
defendant‟s computer would be seized.97 It might also happen 
 
whatever social networking account you have will be key.”). 
95. United States v. Drummond, No. 1:09-cr-00159, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29981 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010) (pictures from defendant‟s MySpace 
page, where he had large amounts of cash and held a gun, were made known 
through the regular channels of discovery). 
96. See Randy L. Dryer, Advising Your Clients (and You!) in the New 
World of Social Media: What Every Lawyer Should Know About Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube, & Wikis, 23 UTAH B.J. 16, 19 (2010), available at 
http://www.utahbar.org/barjournal /pdf/May_June_2010.pdf (“Social media 
clearly expands the universe of potentially discoverable materials and 
impacts data retention/destruction policies. Just as requests for e-mails were 
the discovery rage of the last decade, requests for information on social media 
platforms will soon become standard. Unlike the early internet days where 
digital information was primarily e-mails, information now posted on social 
media sites includes audio, photographs, and video. Virtually everyone has a 
cell phone, and virtually every cell phone has both still photograph and video 
capabilities. And in 2010 we are seeing more and more ways for people to 
access their social media sites (and upload content) through their mobile 
phones. These new technologies are dramatically changing the discovery 
landscape.”). 
97. See generally Electronic Evidence and Search & Seizure Legal 
Resources, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SEC., U.S. DEP‟T OF JUST. 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/searching.html (last visited Oct. 
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in prosecutions involving social media. However, what should 
be done with the material on the third party provider‟s site? 
Can defense counsel advise his client to take down the 
incriminating photographs? Can the prosecutor prevent it? And 
can the court intervene? 
Several recent cases seem to cast doubt on the wisdom of 
advising a client about the disposition of online profiles or 
other social media. There are risks that such advice might 
constitute evidence tampering or obstructing governmental 
administration, which could lead to criminal conviction and 
disbarment. In Matter of Coren,98 a New York attorney pleaded 
guilty to federal felonies that included “mail fraud, wire fraud, 
money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering and 
obstruction of justice (tampering with physical evidence).”99 He 
had allegedly participated in a conspiracy with a client to 
defraud the federal government regarding the administration 
of funds for wage contracts.100 The Disciplinary Committee for 
the New York First Judicial Department sought an order for 
disbarment based on the federal felony conviction. Ultimately, 
the attorney lost his legal challenge to downgrade the 
proceeding from automatic disbarment to a serious crime 
matter. The issue hinged on the similarity between New York 
and federal laws on tampering and obstruction of justice. The 
Appellate Division concluded that there was an “essential 
similarity” between the two and upheld the disbarment.101 
Noteworthy was the plea allocution: 
 
[R]egarding the count in the indictment charging 
obstruction of justice, I admit that on February 3, 
2006, I advised Nomi Beig [his client] in response 
to a question he posed to me that he should 
 
1, 2010). 
98. 76 A.D.3d 285, 285 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2010). 
99. Id. at 286. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 287 (“Respondent‟s conviction for obstruction of justice in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) is a proper predicate for disbarment because 
there is „essential similarity‟ between that federal statute and the New York 
felony of tampering with physical evidence (Penal Law § 215.40[2]).”). 
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destroy a computer flash drive containing 
documents that I advised him to remove from his 
office when I heard that his company was under 
investigation. I knew that by doing so Nomi 
would be destroying documents that could have 
been used in a Government investigation.102 
 
Although he did not erase the computer records himself, 
the attorney was charged with actual tampering, as opposed to 
attempted tampering that would have reduced the charge to a 
misdemeanor under New York law. His plea to this count of the 
federal indictment was sufficient to support automatic 
disbarment. 
In another obstruction case, a Connecticut attorney, Philip 
D. Russell, was indicted for allegedly taking steps to destroy 
the contents of his client‟s laptop computer, which contained 
evidence of illicit pornography.103 The computer belonged to the 
choirmaster of a church, and a fellow employee discovered the 
pornographic images while using it for work. A day later, 
officials of the church “sealed and wrapped” the laptop, 
anticipating its use as evidence. 
The choirmaster met with Russell the following day; the 
lawyer took possession of the computer and destroyed the hard 
drive. Unknown to either of them, an FBI investigation was 
already underway against the choirmaster. The Department of 
Justice charged the attorney with obstruction of justice and 
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (anti-shredding 
prohibition).104 Russell moved to dismiss the charges both 
because the federal investigation was unknown to him at the 
time and because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was not intended to 
apply to pornographic contraband. In other words, the 
government did not “allege any nexus between his obstructive 
conduct and any federal proceeding or investigation that was 
 
102. Id. at 288 (alterations in original); see also United States v. Coren, 
No. 07-CR-265 (ENV), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73913, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
20, 2009). 
103. Evan T. Barr, „Russell‟: Prosecuting Defense Counsel for 
Obstruction, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 2007 at 4. 
104. United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D. Conn. 2007). 
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reasonably foreseeable to him.”105 The district court judge 
denied Russell‟s motion, finding that the “indictment contains 
sufficient factual particularity showing a relationship in time, 
causation, and logic between Russell‟s destruction of Tate‟s 
Computer and a grand jury proceeding or a FBI investigation 
to put him on notice of the charges against him.”106 Russell‟s 
Sarbanes interpretation was also rejected.107 Ultimately, he 
was sentenced to six-months of home confinement, a 
substantial fine and community service.108 
These two cases highlight the risks of counseling or aiding 
a client in the destruction or removal of computer-based 
evidence. On the flip side, what if the prosecutor advises the 
complainant, law enforcement, experts, or a fact witness to 
purge their multimedia online profiles, forestalling defense 
investigators? 109 
Another important facet of this problem is when the police 
and prosecutors have audited the social media information of 
their own witnesses, whether in individual cases or routinely 
through department policies.110 In such instances, the contents 
of those sites might become Brady or Jencks material, or fall 
under the scope of other provisions of the discovery statutes. 
Under those circumstances, a court might issue a protective 
order preventing its deletion or compelling disclosure.111 
 
105. Id. at 232. 
106. Id. at 236. 
107. Id. at 237 (“Nothing in the legislative history supports a conclusion 
that the drafters intended to narrowly circumscribe its application to the 
destruction of business records and documents.”). 
108. See John Christoffersen, Lawyer Who Destroyed Evidence in Porn 
Case Spared Prison Time, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.law.com /jsp/article.jsp?id=1197980085647. 
109. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Interference by Prosecution with 
Defense Counsel‟s Pretrial Interrogation of Witnesses, 90 A.L.R.3d 1231 
(1979). 
110. See, e.g., Rocco Parascandola & Laura Rivera, NYPD Rookies 
Warned About MySpace, Facebook Pages, NEWSDAY, May 6, 2008. 
111. See, e.g., Dryer, supra note 96, at 19 (“Posts on social media are 
within the scope of „electronically stored information‟ as that term is used in 
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Litigation hold letters likely 
trigger an obligation to preserve such posts if they are reasonably related to 
the litigation. This means that just like companies had to revise their 
document retention and destruction policies and their internal protocols for 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6
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Other pitfalls include the risks of independent research or 
communication online by judges, jurors, or other parties and 
witnesses in a case, which might taint or prompt the deletion of 
such evidence.112 A social media snapshot of the state‟s 
witnesses might be required to protect the defendant‟s 
constitutional and statutory discovery rights at a time when 
guidance on obtaining that information independently is 
unclear. 
 
VI.  Undercover Investigation (Pretexting) 
 
The key to understanding how a lawyer should operate in 
the social networking context is the recognition that new 
approaches are necessary. All the rules that the legal 
profession relies on to instruct lawyer behavior were forged 
before the emergence of twenty-first century technology. The 
rule book for this young century has not been written yet, but 
the foundations are there. The application of those principles is 
informed by post-Internet thinking and current online 
realities.113 
Failure to adequately investigate a crime or witnesses, 
whether in the real or virtual worlds, can violate the right to 
counsel and due process.114 Surreptitious online investigation 
 
handling litigation hold requests when e-mail became a pervasive way of 
communicating, so too will these policies require updating to address the 
nuances of social media.”). 
112. See generally Pitfalls, supra note 13, at 5 (discusses ethical 
problems that can occur when judges and lawyers contact each other through 
social networking, and the dangers of independent factual investigations 
through the same method). 
113. See generally ABA, Agenda for Ethics 20/20 Project Examines 
Impact of Technology, Disappearing Borders, 25 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 
694 (2009), http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/impact.pdf (Social networking 
is among the issues to be addressed by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
during its three year tenure). 
114. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (“Counsel „has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.‟”). 
Where the nature of the crime scene is material to the defense, counsel may 
be deemed ineffective for having failed to investigate it properly. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (ineffective 
assistance in part for failure to investigate crime scene where doing so would 
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in some cases might be the best or only method for uncovering 
crucial information, which might otherwise be deleted or 
compromised. The lawyer who fails to pursue it might risk 
accusations of malpractice and ineffectiveness of counsel. It is a 
difficult needle to thread. 
With the rapid pace of technological development, lawyers 
have had to confront unprecedented issues on how to conduct 
discovery, litigation, and professional relations in the face of 
metadata, data mining,115 and now social networking. This 
adds a new wrinkle to the initial client intake. Besides asking 
for contact information and employment history, an attorney 
may be obligated to inquire into a client‟s online presence. 
Whether the lawyer should do it independently without the 
client‟s knowledge raises ethical issues. Of course, asking the 
client directly begs the question of what to do with the answer. 
Accessing Facebook or MySpace is not the same as a 
Google search about a client that would only bring up data 
available to anyone. The former sites have public and private 
areas. A visitor can search the public segment without 
constraint, but to go further and see a client‟s profile, 
membership (registration and agreement to terms of service) is 
required. Without a client‟s consent, the lawyer may be 
overstepping the network‟s terms of service and pushing the 
limits of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mechanically, a 
visit to an online profile might only involve observation and 
recording.116 On the other hand, Friending is a form of contact. 
 
have revealed evidence that, “given the layout of the home and the relatively 
crowded conditions, the alleged assault could not have taken place as 
claimed.”); People v. Donovan, 184 A.D.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
(ineffective assistance where counsel failed “to dispatch an investigator to the 
scene [of defendant's arrest] . . . until after the trial had commenced,” leaving 
him “unprepared to effectively argue [the issue] before the court”). 
115. See, e.g., Armen Keteyian, Digital Photocopiers Loaded with 
Secrets, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/19/eveningnews/main6412439.shtml
?tag=mncol;lst;1 (hard drives of common office equipment, often discarded, 
may contain valuable data). See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Legal Ethics 
of Metadata Mining, 43 AKRON L. REV. 785 (2010). 




266 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
 
And in the case of a witness or complainant, the act might 
cross the line against communicating with a represented party 
or influencing a witness. 
The ethical analysis begins with familiar technology, the 
telephone. ABA Formal Opinion 337, issued in 1974, declared 
“with certain exceptions spelled out in this opinion, no lawyer 
should record any conversation whether by tapes or other 
electronic device, without the consent or prior knowledge of all 
parties to the conversation.”117 The common situations 
identified by the Committee included recording conversations 
involving clients or witnesses. They relied principally on Canon 
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring lawyers 
to avoid the appearance of impropriety and DR 1-102(A)(4) 
prohibiting “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” to 
reach that conclusion.118 A law enforcement exception was 
acknowledged but not fully explored: 
 
There may be extraordinary circumstances 
in which the Attorney General of the United 
States or the principal prosecuting attorney of a 
state or local government or law enforcement 
attorneys or officers acting under the direction of 
the Attorney General or such principal 
prosecuting attorneys might ethically make and 
use secret recordings if acting within strict 
statutory limitations conforming to 
constitutional requirements. This opinion does 
not address such exceptions which would 
necessarily require examination on a case by 
case basis. It should be stressed, however, that 
the mere fact that secret recordation in a 
particular instance is not illegal will not 
necessarily render the conduct of a public law 
 
Evidence,-07/24/82/ (“When a lawyer observes incriminating evidence as a 
result of his representation of the client and does not alter or disturb the 
evidence, he must not disclose these observations to authorities.”). 
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enforcement officer in making such a recording 
ethical.119 
 
In 2001, the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
reexamined its position on the propriety of a lawyer recording a 
phone conversation without the other party‟s knowledge and 
came to the opposite conclusion from Opinion 337, withdrawing 
that precedent.120 The first reason for this change in position 
was the issuance of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The new Rules omitted Canon 9‟s “appearance of impropriety” 
admonition, removing a major pillar justifying their earlier 
analysis. The fraud and deceit section survived in Model Rule 
8.4(c). However, in the intervening quarter century practice 
and perspective on this issue had changed: 
 
First, the belief that nonconsensual taping of 
conversations is inherently deceitful, embraced 
by this Committee in 1974, is not universally 
accepted today. The overwhelming majority of 
states permit recording by consent of only one 
party to the conversation. Surreptitious 
recording of conversations is a widespread 
practice by law enforcement, private 
investigators and journalists, and the courts 
universally accept evidence acquired by such 
techniques. Devices for the recording of 
telephone conversations on one‟s own phone 
readily are available and widely are used. Thus, 
even though recording of a conversation without 
disclosure may to many people “offend a sense of 
honor and fair play,” it is questionable whether 
anyone today justifiably relies on an expectation 
that a conversation is not being recorded by the 
other party, absent a special relationship with or 
 
119. Id. 
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 
(2001). 
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conduct by that party inducing a belief that the 
conversation will not be recorded.121 
 
Although the Committee did not directly address the 
pretexting question,122 it affirmed the “widespread practice” of 
surreptitious recording that changed a party‟s or witness‟ 
expectations. Phone-tapping technology was ubiquitous and 
law enforcement and prosecutors as well as private 
investigators made use of it. These same factors militate in 
favor of accessing a party‟s social media employing common 
technology. The difference is in the nature of the 
communication, not the recording. Thus far, the ABA opinion 
opens the door a crack for contact through the latest 
communication/recording medium, social networking. 
The second point it made was that the recording involved a 
“legitimate and even necessary activity” that would be at risk 
from the danger of an attorney tipping her hand too soon. This 
concept was born of the numerous exceptions to Opinion 337‟s 
proscription found in state bar committee opinions. Of special 
note were opinions from Tennessee and Kentucky123 that 
recognized the need for “recordings by criminal defense 
lawyers, reasoning that the commonly accepted „law 
enforcement exception‟ otherwise would give prosecutors an 
unfair advantage.”124 It also embraced the constitutional 
necessity of leveling the playing field. Some of the other 
exceptions they listed are also used as justifications for 
pretexting,125 e.g., protecting against witness or client perjury, 
 
121. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
122. Id. (“We conclude that the mere act of secretly but lawfully 
recording a conversation inherently is not deceitful, and leave for another day 
the separate question of when investigative practices involving 
misrepresentations of identity and purpose nonetheless may be ethical.”). 
123. See Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal 
Ethics Op. 86-F-14(a) (1986), 
http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/EthicsOpinions/Pdfs/86-F-14%28a%29.pdf; Ky. 
Bar Ass‟n, Ethics Op. KBA E-279 (1984), 
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-279.pdf. 
124. Formal Op. 01-422, at 8. 
125. See N.Y.C. County Lawyer‟s Ass‟n, Formal Op. 737 (2007), 
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf. 
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uncovering housing discrimination and trademark 
infringement, and generally for prosecution and criminal 
defense investigations.126 
Another important facet of the ABA‟s analysis was the 
determination to avoid per se rules and decide each case on its 
merits. It did not see the logic in creating a categorical bar 
swallowed by exceptions and instead advised interdicting 
nonconsensual recordings if accompanied by other 
misconduct.127 
Lastly, the third criticism of Opinion 337, which led to its 
reversal, was a change in philosophy. The Mode Code‟s 
instruction for attorneys to “avoid even the appearance of 
impropriety” had been omitted from the Model Rules. The 
rights of third parties were protected under a direct approach 
embodied in Rule 4.4(a) “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer 
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other 
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use 
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of 
such a person.”128 
As applied to nonconsensual phone recordings, Rule 4.4 
looked to the purpose behind the action. An intent to 
“embarrass” or “burden” a witness, for example, would violate 
the Rule. But the Committee did not differentiate taping a 
phone conversation from other forms of evidence gathering 
since they were not unlawful. The same rationale applied to 
situations where the attorney misrepresented that a 
conversation was not being recorded. Again, it was not the 
acting of recording the phone call that troubled its conscience, 
but the accompanying false statement to a third person in 
violation of Rule 4.1.129 
An attorney or investigator hiding their purpose behind 
Friending a witness‟ or a complainant‟s Facebook or MySpace 
page might run afoul of this kind of prohibition. Friending in 
itself is a lawful, ethical mode of contact. Being secretive about 
 
126. Formal Op. 01-422, at 8. 
127. Id. 
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009). 
129. Formal Op. 01-422, at 5 n.28. 
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the purpose or misleading the recipient of the request might 
border on a false representation. And it again raises the third 
party‟s privacy rights in their profile from surreptitious 
solicitations, whether in state law or the terms of service. 
The federal and state laws governing Internet conduct are 
a patchwork that is continually being tested in the courts. As 
Opinion 01-422 pointed out in the case of one-sided phone 
recordings, a lawyer must be familiar with the laws of the 
jurisdictions involved since Rule 4.4 specifically prohibits 
violating the rights of a third party under state law in 
conducting discovery or investigation.130 Similarly, an attorney 
undertaking discovery through social media must be versed in 
the federal and state laws on computer fraud, cyberbullying, 
and harassment that might ensnare her. Like telephonic 
communication, Internet communication naturally crosses 
state boundaries, imposing a burden on the lawyer to know the 
rules and laws for the jurisdictions involved—although it 
cannot be assumed that such communications are always 
interstate.131 
The Committee was divided over the advisability of 
recording clients without consent and in general considered it 
inadvisable. So they recommended advising him or her at the 
start that conversations might be recorded. Per force, this 
sheds light on the advisability of an attorney viewing a client‟s 
MySpace or Facebook page to download or otherwise review its 
contents. To do so without the client‟s knowledge or consent, 
via pretexting, might violate a lawyer‟s duty of loyalty and risk 
damaging the ability to preserve the confidentiality of attorney-
 
130. Id. at 6. 
131. See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(“We recognize in many, if not most, situations the use of the Internet will 
involve the movement of communications or materials between states. But 
this fact does not suspend the need for evidence of this interstate movement. 
The government offered insufficient proof of interstate movement in this 
case.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally Colin Fieman, Defending Internet 
Pornography Cases by Challenging Interstate Jurisdictional Elements Under 
U.S. v. Schaefer, CHAMPION MAG., Jan. 2009, at 32, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01c1e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/13752
bbd3072166a85257560007eb864?OpenDocument (discussing the importance 
of distinguishing intrastate from interstate transmissions of illicit 
pornography as an element of the government's case). 
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client communications. Moreover, contacting a client through 
her online profile or Twitter, etc., whether directly or 
undercover, increases the chances of inadvertent disclosure and 
destroying privilege. Can a client and attorney communicate by 
Friending each other through social media and still expect 
their conversations to be privileged? 
In an earlier opinion,132 the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed the sanctity 
of e-mail communications, confidentiality, and inadvertent 
disclosure. It concluded: 
 
A lawyer may transmit information relating 
to the representation of a client by unencrypted 
e-mail sent over the Internet without violating 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) 
because the mode of transmission affords a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from a 
technological and legal standpoint. The same 
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-
line telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles 
applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer should 
consult with the client and follow her 
instructions, however, as to the mode of 
transmitting highly sensitive information 
relating to the client‟s representation.133 
 
The Committee‟s reasoning relied heavily on an analysis of 
the privacy features of the technology being used. Under Rule 
1.6, “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry 
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by 
paragraph (b).”134 And the attorney must take reasonable 
measures in selecting a mode of private communication. The 
 
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 
(1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pubs/fo99-413.html. 
133. Id. 
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
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Committee cited the trustworthiness of overland mail, for 
example, and the privacy expectations in telephonic 
communications. As to other technology, some caution was 
indicated, such as facsimile transmission that included a 
greater than normal risk of misdirection, interception, or 
mishandling. Another area of grave concern was the cell phone. 
Cordless and cellular phones broadcasting over public air 
waves were susceptible to interception by many commonly 
available models of radios and similar devices. And as voice 
communication, they were not digitally encoded like e-mail. 
 
The risks of interception and disclosure may 
be lessened by the recent introduction of digital 
cellular phones, whose transmissions are 
considered more difficult to intercept than their 
analog counterparts. New communications 
technology, however, does not always advance 
privacy concerns. The use of airplane telephones, 
for example, exposes users to the interception 
risks of cellular telephones as well as a 
heightened risk of disclosure due to 
eavesdropping on the airplane itself.135 
 
Finally, they resolved that the safeguards and nature of 
Internet-based e-mail provided a reasonable assurance of 
privacy. 
 
The fact that ISP administrators or hackers are 
capable of intercepting Internet e-mail—albeit 
with great difficulty and in violation of federal 
law—should not render the expectation of 
privacy in this medium any the less reasonable, 
just as the risk of illegal telephone taps does not 




135. Formal Op. 99-413, at n.19. 
136. Id. 
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Social media embrace the most dubious characteristics of 
e-mail and cellular transmissions. Their semi-public nature, 
networking among unvetted friends, evolving privacy terms 
and settings, and the endless possibility of republication and 
the impossible task of keeping a secret among hundreds of 
one‟s closest confidants online, makes this form of 
communication unreasonable to preserve confidential 
exchanges of information with clients. And since this form of 
public media has not attained the sanctity of the telephone 
booth,137 it throws doubt on privacy claims that might be 
asserted by targets of undercover defense investigation. 
Again, Opinion 01-422 suggested two areas where secret 
recording of a client‟s phone conversation would not be 
problematic: (1) “where the lawyer has no reason to believe the 
client might object”; (2) “where exceptional circumstances 
exist.”138 The second exception could be triggered in cases 
where the lawyer thinks the client might commit a crime 
“likely” to result in “imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm.”139 This would also open the door to an ethical quandary 
surrounding those instances where a lawyer has learned from 
the client‟s profile that she has admitted responsibility for a 
crime attributed to an innocent third party, who was being 
wrongfully prosecuted for it.140 These cases typically begin 
where the client has confessed to her attorney that she 
 
137. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The 
Government‟s activities in electronically listening to and recording the 
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while 
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a „search and seizure‟ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device 
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the 
booth can have no constitutional significance.”). 
138. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422, 
at 7 (2001). 
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2009) (“A lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death 
or substantial bodily harm”). 
140. See generally Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should 
Be a Wrongful Incarceration-Execution Exception to Attorney-Client 
Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 391 (2008); Ken Strutin, 
Wrongful Conviction and Attorney-Client Confidentiality, LLRX.COM (Jan. 9, 
2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/wrongfulconvictionconfidentiality.htm. 
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committed the crime that someone is being charged with in the 
course of confidential meetings. However, if a lawyer directly or 
discretely examined a client‟s social media and unearthed this 
information without the client‟s knowledge, another layer of 
conflict is created. 
ABA Opinion 01-422 lays the groundwork for a 
nonconsensual contact through social media for “legitimate” 
and “necessary” activities associated with the right to present a 
defense. And it illustrates some of the potential pitfalls 
awaiting incautious counsel gathering evidence undercover. On 
the other hand there are compelling constitutional imperatives 
that demand an attorney investigate social media in order to 
prepare and present a defense.141 The foundations for these 
requirements can be found in the measurement of effective 
assistance of counsel and the use of technology. 
In Gill v. State,142 a Missouri man had been convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. A key issue on his 
appeal was the failure of his attorney to review the contents of 
the victim‟s computer. During the penalty phase of the trial, 
the prosecution introduced evidence of the victim‟s good 
character. Before trial and in the course of discovery, a report 
had been found in defendant‟s car detailing the contents of the 
victim‟s computer,143 including lists of file names, folders, and 
instant messages. Neither defense counsel interviewed the 
detective who prepared the report or flagged any issues other 
than inquiring of the prosecutor if there was any incriminating 
or exculpatory information.144 
 
141. See Ken Strutin, Hiding in Plain Sight: Evidence on Social 
Networking Sites, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 2009, at 5 [hereinafter Hiding in Plain 
Sight]. 
142. 300 S.W.3d 225 (Mo. 2009). 
143. Id. at 228 n.2 (“The victim‟s computer was relevant to the 
investigation and prosecution of the crime because, after the murder, Gill and 
his co-defendant, Justin Brown, used the computer to transfer $55,000 from 
one of the victim‟s accounts to an ATM-accessible account so that they could 
access the money.”). 
144. Id. at 228 (“The prosecutor assured defense counsel that there was 
nothing on the computer that he planned to use in the case or that implicated 
another potential defendant. Relying on the prosecutor‟s assertions, defense 
counsel decided to focus their attention away from the computer's contents.”). 
47
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At a post-penalty hearing, the detective who prepared the 
report testified that “he knew there was pornography on the 
computer within a few days of creating the report. Before Gill‟s 
trial, he looked at the transcript of the instant message 
conversation about the 17-year-old daughter.”145 This 
revelation was not discovered until the attorney for Gill‟s co-
defendant, Brown, spoke with the Lieutenant before his trial 
and requested a copy of the hard drive for independent 
analysis. The analyst testified at Gill‟s hearing that there were 
instant messages and other files containing illicit sexual 
content on the victim‟s computer. Due to this discovery, the 
prosecution did not introduce the same good character evidence 
in the co-defendant‟s penalty phase, thus making the 
information irrelevant. Brown was eventually sentenced to life 
in prison.146 
On appeal of Gill‟s case, the court first dispensed with the 
Brady violation claim. The defense had a copy of the report 
that would have led to uncovering this information. The 
defense‟s failure to recognize it did not render the information 
undisclosed.147 More importantly, defendant‟s second claim was 
that defense counsel should have identified the pornography 
evidence on the victim‟s computer and used it in the penalty 
phase to preclude the prosecution from introducing the good 
character evidence or to rebut it. On this point, the appellate 
court agreed: 
 
By failing to discover those files on the 
victim‟s computer, Gill‟s counsel‟s performance 
was deficient. A reasonably competent attorney 
would have carefully reviewed the report 
provided by the State and recognized file names 
like “a_slutty18girl_w38c” and 
“sweet_tasting_slute” as evidence of sexually 
explicit material on the computer. A reasonably 
competent attorney would have conducted 
 
145. Id. at 229. 
146. Id. at 230-31. 
147. Id. at 231. 
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further investigation as to the contents of the 
computer and discovered the child pornography 
images, bestiality content, and sexually explicit 
instant message conversations about the 17-year-
old daughter. Then, a reasonably competent 
attorney would have rebutted the State‟s 
character evidence at the penalty phase.148 
 
Additionally, the court held that Gill‟s attorneys should 
have interviewed the police investigator who prepared the 
report. The investigator was on the state‟s witness list and was 
the first to examine the victim‟s computer. Based on the leads 
in the report, a discussion with the Lieutenant would have 
unearthed all the details of the pornography on the victim‟s 
machine that would have proved invaluable at the sentencing 
phase of the trial. 
The essence of the Gill decision was that valuable and 
necessary information about a victim was available from her 
computer, and that information had been made known to 
defense counsel, who did not act on it. This scenario has much 
in common with social media investigations. First, if a 
complainant or prosecution witness has posted exculpatory, 
impeaching, or self-incriminating information online, and the 
government knows about it, then it ought to be disclosed. And 
the defense should have the opportunity to view it 
independently. Facebook or MySpace are fundamentally 
another hard drive, a remote site where people store 
information similar to their home computer—actually it is 
duplicative in many instances since the content originates from 
a personal data device, which presumably stores a copy. Since 
the right to counsel compels a defendant‟s lawyer to pursue 
witness computer records revealed through discovery, specific 
motions grounded on Brady and Jencks and statutory 
disclosure rights should be considered for potential social 
networking evidence. 
Social media has become the new “mass observer,” and in 
 
148. Id. at 233. 
49
2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES 277 
 
terms of discovery, a ready recorder of spontaneous events.149 
The defense attorney for a former Illinois police officer, accused 
of shooting another man in a Pontoon Beach bar parking lot 
and charged with aggravated battery with a firearm, filed a 
motion asking to subpoena Facebook for the identity of 
witnesses at the scene.150 “The motion seeks disclosure from 
Facebook of 23 individual user profiles and the actions of a 
Facebook group called „Jeff Bladdick is a bulletproof badass‟ 
going back to the day before the Nov. 9, 2008 incident.”151 The 
attorney learned about the Facebook group from an anonymous 
source. In support of his motion, counsel marshaled familiar 
arguments: “[H]is client‟s constitutional rights fall within 
exceptions of the 2000 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
and said that law enforcement regularly accesses the same 
records for its own investigations.”152 This evidence was 
essential to mounting a self-defense argument.153 Facebook 
responded by pointing to the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, which prevented it from complying. In addition, 
the company claimed it would be technologically overwhelming 
to locate twenty-three profiles out of three-hundred and fifty 
million.154 The motion, which appears to have been the first of 
its kind, was ultimately denied and the case ended in a plea 
bargain.155 In other words, social media discovery by the 
 
149. See generally Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What 
Happens on Facebook Stay on Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and 




150. See Joe Harris, Indicted Cop Challenges Facebook‟s Privacy Rights, 




153. Id. (“Watkins [defendant's attorney] claims that Pour acted in self-
defense after he was attacked by two people in a Pontoon Beach bar parking 
lot. Watkins says Pour pulled the gun from the back of his waistband during 
the attack and fired, and mistakenly hit Bladdick [victim].”). 
154. Id. 
155. See Terry Hillig, Former St. Louis Officer Pleads Guilty in Shooting 
Prosecutor Offers Lesser Charge in Altercation Outside Sports Bar in Pontoon 
Beach in 2008, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 2010 (“Watkins [defendant‟s 
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defense is unguided by statute or ethical code. However, the 
firmest grounds for making such discovery requests are the 
right to counsel, compulsory process, and due process, and 
reciprocal rights of investigation on par with the government. 
When direct discovery offers no revelations and the 
government does not possess social media information from 
witnesses, it is defense counsel‟s duty to investigate. In light of 
the massive participation in social media, it would be difficult 
to argue that a reasonable lawyer could ignore a resource of 
such magnitude.156 So the question becomes what are the risks 
associated with investigating prosecution witnesses in the 
semi-secluded online world of Facebook and MySpace? 
The dilemma occurs when an attorney, in order to 
effectively represent her client, tries to uncover impeaching 
evidence on a witness computer using deception. In Office of 
Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley,157 a man charged with sexually 
assaulting a child and possession and exhibition of illicit 
pornography hired Hurley to represent him. A key issue for the 
defense was the accusation that the defendant had forced a 
fifteen year-old child, S.B., to view pornography.158 However, 
“Hurley believed that S.B. had an independent interest in, and 
the ability to access, the materials . . . .”159 To uncover evidence 
that S.B. had been lying, Hurley devised an investigation plan 
that would allow him to examine the contents of S.B.‟s 
 
attorney] sought at one point in Pour‟s criminal case to subpoena records of 
22 people from the Facebook social networking website. They included police 
officers who investigated the shooting, as well as other potential witnesses, 
Watkins said. Attorneys for Facebook argued that federal law prevented 
Facebook from disclosing the material, and Associate Judge James Hackett 
agreed in a ruling in July. He said disclosure was barred by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.”) 
156. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 1 (“Facebook is expected to say this week 
that it has reached 500 million users, making it the biggest information 
network on the Internet in a meteoric rise that has connected the world into 
an online statehood of status updates, fan pages and picture exchanges.”). 
157. 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181 (Feb. 5, 2008). 
158. Id. 
159. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley, No. 2007AP478-D (Wis. Feb. 
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computer. If S.B. had been alerted to this plan, there was a 
grave risk of spoliation. Unlike Gill, there was some question 
about the detective‟s interest in preserving this evidence, so no 
direct formal discovery request was feasible.160 
Hurley hired a private investigator and, after exploring the 
options together, they devised an undercover operation. The 
investigator sent a letter to S.B. advising him that he had been 
selected to participate in a computer usage survey and, in 
exchange for surrendering his computer for ninety days, he 
would get a free laptop. Hurley provided guidelines for the 
investigator that included making sure the mother was present 
during his interactions with S.B. and the child would be 
allowed to remove any contents from the computer he desired 
before turning it over. The exchange was made according to 
plan and the computer turned over to a forensic expert who 
found illicit pornographic images. 
In 2007, the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
filed a complaint161 against Hurley for employing “dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” in violation of the state‟s 
Supreme Court Rules. The referee‟s report stated that the OLR 
did not meet its burden of proof. Testimony presented at the 
disciplinary hearing established that “there was a widespread 
belief in the Wisconsin bar that the type of conduct engaged in 
by Attorney Hurley was and is acceptable.”162 Even the 
prosecutor behind the grievance affirmed that deceit was a 
recognized practice in its undercover operations involving 
nonlawyer investigators. The OLR director agreed that this 
type of investigation practice was recognized for prosecutors, 
but not private attorneys, although no authority had been cited 
to support the differentiation. 
Approving the referee‟s conclusion that Hurley did not 
intend to break any rules or realize that his conduct might 
have done so, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin quoted this 
telling paragraph from the referee‟s report: 
 
160. Id. 
161. Based on allegations made by the district attorney‟s office involved 
in the criminal case. Id. at 3. 
162. Id. at 2. 
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Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult 
decision, with concurrent and conflicting 
obligations: should he zealously defend his client, 
fulfill his constitutional obligation to provide 
effective assistance of counsel, and risk breaking 
a vague ethical rule that, according to the record, 
had never been enforced in this way? Or should 
he knowingly fail to represent [the defendant] in 
the manner to which he was entitled and hand 
him persuasive grounds for appeal, an ethics 
complaint, and a malpractice claim? The Sixth 
Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr. 
Hurley. A man‟s liberty was at stake. Mr. Hurley 
had to choose, and he chose reasonably, in light 
of his obligations and the vagueness of the 
[supreme court rules].163 
 
Gill and Hurley both speak to the fundamental importance 
of right to counsel, which encompasses conducting a thorough 
investigation. The contents of personal and home computing 
devices have been extended firmly into the realm of third party 
hosts, with their own rules of conduct. Inevitably, attorneys 
will have to enter this virtual world to fulfill their 
constitutional and ethical obligations, which brings us to the 
paucity of authority that has treated this issue. 
In 2005, the Oregon State Bar issued an opinion164 
establishing guidelines for lawyers whose investigations took 
them into the public lanes of the Information Highway. 
Essentially, they distinguished visits to a public page of an 
opponent‟s website and crossing the threshold by making 
contact through that website. The scenario involved a civil case 
in which the defendant had an Internet page accessible to 
anyone, which the plaintiff‟s lawyer wanted to view. Oregon 
 
163. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Hurley, 2008 
Wisc. LEXIS 1181) (Referee‟s Report and Recommendation). 
164. Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-164 
(2005), http://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2005-164.pdf. 
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RPC 4.2 cautioned against contacting a represented party, and 
has been interpreted to apply to any mode of communication. 
However, the purpose of the rule, to assure that represented 
persons had the benefit of counsel when speaking with 
opposing counsel, was not implicated by seeing the contents of 
a site open to anyone. Any public matter published by an 
adverse party, regardless of format, was fair game. 
Moreover, the Legal Ethics Committee divorced the notion 
of communication from viewing online: “A lawyer who reads 
information posted for general public consumption simply is 
not communicating with the represented owner of the Web 
site.”165 In the footnote to this line, they make a very cogent 
and significant observation: “For purposes of this opinion, a 
Web site can be „public‟ even if an access fee or a subscription 
fee is charged.”166 Access that implies registration brings it 
within the ambit of social media sites. Of course, the terms of 
service may vary, but the Oregon State Bar believed that 
joining a site or registering alone was not problematic, it would 
be the next step of communication that tips the balance. 
Notably, it avoided directly addressing the pretexting question 
in this same footnote. 
The concern over engaging an opponent through her web 
page was a possible violation of the attorney-client privilege. If 
a lawyer knew that the person she was communicating with 
online was represented, such contact would violate the Rule.167 
But if the person was some low-level employee who might only 
be a fact witness, then the communication would not raise any 




167. This would also apply to situations where clients undertake to 
speak with a represented party under the direction of or with the 
involvement of counsel. See, e.g., Trumbull Cnty. Bar Ass‟n v. Makridis, 77 
Ohio St. 3d 73 (1996) (attorney representing client in civil suit reprimanded 
for overseeing a phone call by his client to opposing party to discuss client‟s 
testimony, then taking the phone and speaking to the other represented 
party directly). 
168. Formal Op. 2005-164, at 3 (“Lawyer A could not use Internet 
communications to invade the adverse party‟s lawyer client privilege. If, on 
the other hand, Lawyer A does not invade the adverse party‟s privilege and 
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website that she did not know was represented, but actually 
was, there would still be no problem.169 
So the complications would arise when a lawyer leaves the 
public side of the web and joins a social media site for the 
purposes of making contact with a witness. Getting in does not 
seem to be a problem, according to the Oregon opinion, any 
more than it would be for any Internet site that charged a fee 
or required registration. Significantly, complainants and 
witnesses in criminal prosecutions are largely unrepresented, 
so a defense attorney might likely be in the position of someone 
who did not “know” whether individuals in a case had counsel, 
dispensing with Rule 4.2 concerns. The heart of the problem is 
the one specifically not addressed by the Oregon Bar, 
pretexting. 
Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance 
Committee Opinion 2009-02, published in March 2009, is the 
first known authority to directly address undercover 
investigations in social media.170 It involved a civil case and the 
deposition of an unrepresented eighteen-year-old witness who 
was giving evidence favorable to the opposition. During 
questioning she admitted having Facebook and MySpace 
 
communicates only with a nonmanagerial employee who is merely a fact 
witness, no violation would exist.”). 
169. Id. 
170. Later opinions on social networking and discovery have followed 
the Philadelphia approach. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass‟n Comm. on Prof‟l Ethics, Op. 
843 (2010), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions 
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=43208 (“A lawyer 
who represents a client in a pending litigation, and who has access to the 
Facebook or MySpace network used by another party in litigation, may access 
and review the public social network pages of that party to search for 
potential impeachment material. As long as the lawyer does not „friend‟ the 
other party or direct a third person to do so, accessing the social network 
pages of the party will not violate Rule 8.4 (prohibiting deceptive or 
misleading conduct), Rule 4.1 (prohibiting false statements of fact or law), or 
Rule 5.3(b)(1) (imposing responsibility on lawyers for unethical conduct by 
nonlawyers acting at their direction).”); Ass‟n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 
Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2010.htm (“[A] lawyer may not use deception 
to access information from a social networking webpage. Rather, a lawyer 
should rely on the informal and formal discovery procedures sanctioned by 
the ethical rules and case law to obtain relevant evidence.”). 
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accounts. The Committee observed that these personal pages 
limited access to certain individuals according to the account 
holder‟s preference. The deposing lawyer had reason to think 
that her pages might contain impeaching material. He did not 
directly or openly ask the witness‟ permission to access the 
pages but tried unsuccessfully to get to those pages without her 
consent. From what he did see, the lawyer concluded that she 
had a liberal policy of letting people have access to her profile. 
His proposed investigation plan was as follows: 
 
The inquirer proposes to ask a third person, 
someone whose name the witness will not 
recognize, to go to the Facebook and MySpace 
websites, contact the witness and seek to “friend” 
her, to obtain access to the information on the 
pages. The third person would state only truthful 
information, for example, his or her true name, 
but would not reveal that he or she is affiliated 
with the lawyer or the true purpose for which he 
or she is seeking access, namely, to provide the 
information posted on the pages to a lawyer for 
possible use antagonistic to the witness. If the 
witness allows access, the third person would 
then provide the information posted on the pages 
to the inquirer who would evaluate it for possible 
use in the litigation.171 
 
This is a classic pretexting operation, and one which has 
been approved in cases involving civil rights, law enforcement, 
and intellectual property infringement.172 On the surface, none 
 
171. Phila. Bar Ass‟n, Formal Op. 2009-02 (2009), 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf. 
172. See, e.g., N.Y.C. County Lawyer‟s Ass‟n, Formal Op. 737 (2007), 
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf (“In New 
York, while it is generally unethical for a non-government lawyer to 
knowingly utilize and/or supervise an investigator who will employ 
dissemblance in an investigation, we conclude that it is ethically permissible 
in a small number of exceptional circumstances where the dissemblance by 
investigators is limited to identity and purpose and involves otherwise lawful 
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of the recognized exceptions applied to this civil action, so the 
Philadelphia Committee‟s Opinion focused principally on 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) 
concerning “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” 
They believed that the proposed surreptitious investigation 
would violate this rule: 
 
It omits a highly material fact, namely, that the 
third party who asks to be allowed access to the 
witness‟s pages is doing so only because he or she 
is intent on obtaining information and sharing it 
with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the 
testimony of the witness. The omission would 
purposefully conceal that fact from the witness 
for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow 
access, when she may not do so if she knew the 
third person was associated with the inquirer 
and the true purpose of the access was to obtain 
information for the purpose of impeaching her 
testimony.173 
 
activity undertaken solely for the purpose of gathering evidence. Even in 
these cases, a lawyer supervising investigators who dissemble would be 
acting unethically unless (i) either (a) the investigation is of a violation of 
civil rights or intellectual property rights and the lawyer believes in good 
faith that such violation is taking place or will take place imminently or (b) 
the dissemblance is expressly authorized by law; and (ii) the evidence sought 
is not reasonably and readily available through other lawful means; and (iii) 
the lawyer‟s conduct and the investigator‟s conduct that the lawyer is 
supervising do not otherwise violate the New York Lawyer‟s Code of 
Professional Responsibility (the „Code‟) or applicable law; and (iv) the 
dissemblance does not unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third 
parties. These conditions are narrow. Attorneys must be cautious in applying 
them to different situations. In most cases, the ethical bounds of permissible 
conduct will be limited to situations involving the virtual necessity of non-
attorney investigator(s) posing as an ordinary consumer(s) engaged in an 
otherwise lawful transaction in order to obtain basic information not 
otherwise available. This opinion does not address the separate question of 
direction of investigations by government lawyers supervising law 
enforcement personnel where additional considerations, statutory duties and 
precedents may be relevant. This opinion also does not address whether a 
lawyer is ever permitted to make dissembling statements directly himself or 
herself.”). See generally Hiding in Plain Sight, supra note 141, at 5. 
173. Formal Op. 2009-02, at 3. 
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Concealment of identity and purpose was impermissible in 
this context. And the witness‟s risky policy of accepting 
“Friends” with little information did not validate the lawyer‟s, 
or investigator‟s, approach. The privacy policy of the witness 
did not factor into the analysis of whether the deceit was 
permissible under the Code. In other words, there was no way 
to sanitize the conduct of any person who might have access 
the witness‟ page at the direction of the attorney, regardless of 
the information they provided.174 The Committee distinguished 
this situation from a day in the life video that might record an 
unsuspecting plaintiff out in “public” to impeach her claims, 
because information on social networking sites was intended to 
be kept private.175 
The Committee went on to consider the limitations of 
deception in legal investigation, criminal and civil, and 
exceptions to further societal good, such as uncovering 
unlawful and discriminatory behavior.176 Without addressing 
the blanket prohibition of covert investigation recognized by 
some states or the exceptions endorsed in others, the 
Committee found that in this scenario it was unethical.177 
This opinion was rendered in a bubble, and peremptorily 
 
174. Id. at 4 (“The Committee believes that in addition to violating Rule 
8.4(c), the proposed conduct constitutes the making of a false statement of 
material fact to the witness and therefore violates Rule 4.1 as well.”). 
175. Id. at 3. 
176. Id. at 4-6. 
177. The Committee also declined to answer the question about the 
admissibility of social media evidence obtained through pretexting. This is 
another important problem that has to be resolved in tandem with the ethics 
and legitimacy of the investigative technique; otherwise the evidence may be 
precluded or suppressed. See Berman et al., supra note 63, at 5 (analyzes 
issues associated with introducing evidence from second generation web 
sources such as social networking). See generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. 
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007) (discusses basic tenets of admitting 
electronic or digital evidence analyzing the difficulties in establishing 
relevancy, authenticity, overcoming hearsay, best evidence, and prejudice 
versus probity arguments); Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: 
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the 
Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 367 
(2009) (update on the evidentiary foundation requirements for electronic 
evidence first discussed in the Lorraine decision, including: e-mail, web sites, 
text messages, and computer generated evidence). 
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closed off a huge and vital area of discovery. The trouble lies in 
the concepts of privacy and purpose, and the thin veil that can 
deflect legitimate and necessary covert investigations. As one 
scholar has observed, it was unfair to exempt government law 
enforcement, civil rights and intellectual property from the bar 
on undercover work without a critical rationale behind these 
choices.178 Moreover, he suggested a “neutral” test that might 
be applied more fairly: 
 
[T]he search should be for neutral principles that 
reasonably balance the benefits and risks of such 
technology. These neutral principles should focus 
less on whether the lawyer/investigator is 
operating anonymously or with a pseudonym. 
Rather, they should concentrate more on the 
intrusiveness of the technique and the risk that 
confidential or privileged information may be 
improperly revealed in the process.179 
 
A reasonable guideline for criminal cases is the “societal 
good” criterion, i.e., the fair administration of justice. The goal 
would be to prevent or address current problems in the system 
that result in wrongful convictions. These should be addressed 
at the earliest stages of a case to preserve the presumption of 




Today, hundreds of millions of people are sharing 
information, communicating, and archiving the details of their 
lives online. Through canyons of Internet bandwidth, an 
increasingly complex forum of overlapping voices are being 
created, preserved and transmitted worldwide. Thirty years 
 
178. See Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of “Pretexting” in a Cyber World, 41 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 271, 279 (2010) (“Ethics authorities should not arbitrarily 
limit the benefits of such information or favor certain categories of lawyers 
over others.”). 
179. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ago, the Supreme Court recognized that most people were 
getting their information about court proceedings from 
electronic and print media.180 Now, our society is in the midst 
of a personal data revolution in which new enclaves of data and 
individual metrics are being created on a monumental scale.181 
Social networking will surpass diaries, photo albums, and 
paper correspondence; it will supersede e-mail and telephonic 
communication; it will even trump television, radio, and 
newspapers as the principal source of news and personal 
information.182 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and the other social media 
gained prominence rapidly. Their power is still unmeasured 
and the rules for their uses unclear. In a sense, social 
networking is the Promethean fire of the Information Age. 
Without guidance, it spells mischief for the lawyers who must 
use it to represent their clients. The question has changed from 
how to find information about witnesses and parties online, to 
how to find information within ethical and legal boundaries 
that will be in existence when the case comes to trial.183 
 
180. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 
(1980) (“With the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the 
representations or reality of the real life drama once available only in the 
courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespread pastime.”). 
181. See Richard Macmanus, The Coming Data Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2010/05/31/31readwriteweb-
the-coming-data-explosion-13154.html (“One of the key aspects of the 
emerging Internet of Things—where real-world objects are connected to the 
Internet—is the massive amount of new data on the Web that will result. As 
more and more „things‟ in the world are connected to the Internet, it follows 
that more data will be uploaded to and downloaded from the cloud. And this 
is in addition to the burgeoning amount of user-generated content—which 
has increased 15-fold over the past few years, according to a presentation 
that Google VP Marissa Mayer made last August at Xerox PARC. Mayer said 
during her presentation that this „data explosion is bigger than Moore‟s 
law.‟”). 
182. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 16. See generally Internet Gains on 
Television as Public‟s Main News Source, PEW RES. CENTER (Jan. 4, 2011), 
http://people-press.org/report/689/. 
183. See generally Mark A. Berman, The Ethics of Social Networking 
Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 2010, at 5 (“Just like conducting Westlaw or 
Lexis due diligence on an individual, social networking sites need to be 
reviewed as part of discovery protocol when seeking to obtain relevant 
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The big problem is that the standards of privacy and 
criminal behavior are being defined in large part by the terms 
of service and technology options set by social networking 
providers. The Drew Lori case taught us that a breach of 
contract, such as a terms of service contract, was unlikely to 
sustain a violation of federal criminal law.184 Privatizing 
criminal law or definitions of privacy are problematic and 
unconstitutional. It would be an abdication of the legislative 
function to permit private Internet-based services to define 
online privacy or criminalize behavior vaguely described in 
browser- and clip-wrap contracts. The legislatures have to 
update the definitions of criminal laws related to electronic 
media in the discovery and penal statutes. Moreover, the courts 
must be adept and up to date on the latest technology 
innovations that might influence the interpretation of legal and 
ethical rules for attorney conduct in this virtual environment 
as in other developing areas.185 
Social networking is a convergence technology, combining 
communication media and information storage in 
unprecedented ways. A new unified approach is necessary to 
administer the application of criminal law, evidentiary rules, 
and ethical constraints in this context. As courts and counsel 
 
information concerning a person or entity.”); Thomas G. Frongillo & Daniel 
K. Gelb, It‟s Time to Level the Playing Field—The Defense‟s Use of Evidence 
from Social Networking Sites, CHAMPION, Aug. 2010, at 14 (“Comprehensive 
discovery of evidence from social networks is now imperative. The 
prosecution obtained an early lead. It‟s time for the defense to level the 
playing field and aggressively use this rich source of information at trial.”). 
184. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
185. See, e.g., Committee on the Development of the Third Edition of the 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, COMM. ON SCI., TECH. & L., 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/stl/development_manual/index.htm 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (“At the request of the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC), and in collaboration with the FJC, [the Committee on Science, 
Technology, and Law] will develop the third edition of the Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence. The Reference Manual assists judges in managing 
cases involving complex scientific and technical evidence by describing the 
basic tenets of key scientific fields from which legal evidence is typically 
derived and providing examples of cases in which that evidence has been 
used. The development of the third edition will follow the basic structure of 
the current edition, but will include, in addition to updating, new topics and 
annotated case citations.”). 
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wend their way through the thickets, a fundamental 
constitutional analysis will serve as the best guidepost. The 
right to present a defense and reciprocal discovery are well 
established and supported by Supreme Court precedent. Until 
the nuances of cyber criminal investigations are worked out, 
judges should maintain the balance of rights by leveling the 
playing field between prosecutors and defense. If the 
government is permitted access to Facebook or Twitter, if the 
prosecution can introduce YouTube videos and iPhone 
messages, then due process demands the same rights for the 
defense. For law enforcement, social media are among the first 
avenues to be investigated undercover, and there are no logical 
reasons why the defense should have to exhaust all other 
options before following the same path. In this area, the delete 
button and risk of spoliation of digital media make early entry 
into a witness social profile an unacknowledged imperative for 
the defense as much as for the prosecution. 
We have entered a new part of the Information Age, the 
Social Media Era.186 It is the time of quantum computing and 
the specter of nearly a billion personal profiles online. 
Countries around the world are evolving into societies that 
permit unbounded sharing and displaying of personal 
multimedia experiences. To paraphrase Andy Warhol, everyone 
wants their 15 gigabytes of fame. And all fame has its price. 
The cost of this freedom is a qualified privacy, a cloverleaf 
intersection weaving electronic human activities with the law, 
and the unveiling of new avenues of investigation. The best 
“path forward” for discovery in social space is to recognize that 
it is unprecedented and construct rules that remain faithful to 
the constitutional and ethical principles that have served 
society in the physical world. Due process and the fair 
 
186. Online communities are really no different than the unregulated 
ancient Roman bathhouses, where people came together to talk, relax and 
entertain themselves, while baring all. And bandwidth, like currents of 
water, is the well that draws people together. See JAMES SALZMAN, THIRST: A 
SHORT HISTORY OF DRINKING WATER (2005), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2043&context 
=faculty_scholarship (“The main reason for construction of the aqueducts was 
not hygienic but social. Bath houses were an integral part of Roman society 
and they required large volumes of water.”). 
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administration of justice dictate that there ought to be an equal 
right of access and use of virtual evidence regardless of changes 
in the mechanics of human communication and interaction. 
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